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We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change.'
[N]or [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
2
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
The Fifth Amendment's guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar

Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne
3
by the public as a whole.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The 1990s have been hailed as the decade of the environment. As
this appellation is replaced by new legislative mandates and regulatory fiats, clashes will develop over the extent to which private property rights ought to be respected. President Bush is propelling the nation toward a "no net loss" of wetlands policy,4 and the spotted owl
has become part of every dinner table (conversation)." A republican
Senator has warned that we cannot protect the environment "if we are
going to give into private property rights."' The national media
breathlessly exudes the new ethic of the environment in cartoons,
commercials, and public-affairs shows of every stripe. At the same
time, multimillion dollar judgments are being awarded for damages to
property rights caused by environmental regulation, 7 and the United
1. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), cited in Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987) (noting that this is one of the "principal" rationales for the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause); see also San Diego Gas &
Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Penn
Central Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
4. See Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Army Corps of Engineers and the Environmental Protection Agency, 55 Fed. Reg. 9210 (1991) [hereinafter Memorandum of Agreement].
5. See Michael Satchell, The Endangered Logger: Big Business and a Little Bird
Threaten a Northwest Way of Life, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 25, 1990, at 27;
see also Charles C. Mann and Mark L. Plummer, The Butterfly Problem; Government
Protection of Endangered Species, ATLANTIC, January, 1992, at 47.
6. Warren Brookes, Wetlands-ProtectionPolicy Draws Fire, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 13,

1991, at C3 (quoting Senator John Chafee).
7. See, e.g., Whitney Benefits v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991)($60 million plus interest awarded for taking of coal
deposit); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (1988) (Loveladies I);
Loveladies Harbor, Inc v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990) (Loveladies II), appeal
pending in Federal Circuit Court of Appeals ($2.6 million awarded for taking of wetlands after fill permit denied); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893
(Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987) (Florida Rock I); Florida Rock
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990) (Florida Rock 11)($1.02 million
awarded for taking of wetland), appeal pending in Federal Circuit Court of Appeals;

see also Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (taking found when
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States Supreme Court recently agreed to decide three major property
rights cases, including one which may determine whether regulation of
coastal zones constitutes a taking.'
America's firm and forthright decision to protect endangered species, regardless of the cost, is resulting in an unprecedented boon for a
"Gala goulash" of species from saltmarsh mice, minnows, sea turtles,
fringe-toed lizards, red squirrels, desert tortoises, and, of course, the
noble spotted owl." In the case of the owl, while it may be relatively
easy for agencies such as the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
to administrate a habitat protection plan that will cause the loss of
between 62,273 and 131,000 jobs and increase housing costs,"0 there
could be some serious "takings" costs involved as well. Specifically, if
owners of private old growth forests are unable to harvest trees because of the spotted owl, will that be considered a taking of their
property?
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has shown an
increased solicitude towards the preservation of private property
rights." The state courts, however, have not universally followed this
trend. In fact, when confronted with the choice between protecting

monitoring wells placed on property for purpose of assessing nearby toxic waste
dump); Award to Oil Firms Appealed, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 9, 1991, at 1E (appeal of award); Miller Bros. v. State of Michigan, No. 88-11848-CM (Mich. Ct. Cl.,
Sept. 20, 1991) ($71 million plus nearly $29 million interest awarded to oil companies
prohibited from drilling in Michigan's Nordhouse Dunes); MINN STAR TRIB., Feb. 24,
1992, at 1 ($761,818 awarded in settlement of Beur&Co. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 42
(1988). This is first actual payment of money in a wetland takings suit).
8. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991), cert.
granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991) (Court will decide whether building prohibition in
coastal zone is a "taking"); PFZ Properties v. Rodriguez, 928 F.2d. 28, cert. granted
112 S. Ct. 414 (1991), cert. dismissed, No. 91-122, 1992 WL 49782 (U.S. Mar. 9, 1992);
Yee v. City of Escondido (Court decides mobile home park rent control is not a "physical invasion" takings and declines to rule whether or not it is a "regulatory taking.")
9. U. S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV.. ENDANGERED

SPECIES TECHNICAL BULLETIN

(Feb. 1991) (605 species listed in United States); but see Joel Berger, Funding Asymmetries for Endangered Species, Feral Animals, and Livestock (Roundtable), 41 BiosCIENCE 105 (Feb. 1991) (not all species faring equally well). The press coverage of the
subject is growing with the impact of the act. See, e.g., Charles McCoy, Little Fish
May Put California in Hot Water, WALL ST. J,, July 10, 1991, at BI (water shipments
to farms threatened by Delta Smelt); Dennis Pfaff, Marshland Sale Meets a Challenge, S.F. DAILY J., July 3, 1991, at 1 (concerning saltmarsh mice); Charles McCoy,
Salmon Battle Could Spawn Much Bitterness, WALL ST. J., June 5,1991, at BI; Susan
Sward, Endangered Species Act's Successes Have Been Few, S.F. CHRON., May 14,
1990, at Al (general overview).
10. U. S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., NEWS RELEASE 91-43, Aug. 5, 1991, at 6 (62,273
jobs lost); New Court Clash Over Spotted Owl, S.F. CHRON-, May 1, 1991, at B12 (labor
estimates further restrictions on owl will raise timber unemployment to 131,000); Rudy
Abramson, U.S. Designates Owl Habitat but Acreage Is Cut, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1992
(33,000 to 100,000 jobs to be lost); Carl Nolte, Whittled-Down Logging Ban In Owl
Habitat, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 10, 1992 (33,000 jobs to be lost); Spotted Owl Surcharge,
WALL ST. J., June 21, 1991 (lumber prices 30% higher); Spotted Owl Bumps Lumber
Prices 30%, BUFFALO NEWS, July 6, 1991, at HF 31.
11. See, e.g., Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme
Court Establishes New Ground Rules for Land-Use Planning,20 URB. L. 735 (1988).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1992

5

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 27 [1992], Iss. 2, Art. 4
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XXVII

wetlands for free, and paying property owners for their wetlands made
undevelopable by regulation, many courts opt to take the wetlands for
Washington, and New Hampfree. The Supreme Courts of Wisconsin,
2
shire have been leaders in this trend.1
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court issued the most significant series of cases on takings since Justice Holmes' 1922 opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal. 3 In the five years since the 1987 decisions of Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis," First English
EvangelicalLutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,1 5
and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,'6 appellate opinions
from the state and federal courts have only begun to fill the interstices
in the law of regulatory takings left unfilled by the United States Supreme Court.' 7 Nevertheless, no matter how one views the reach of
these decisions, it is certain that they have changed the landscape of
regulatory takings.
It is also certain that the regulation of wetlands and endangered
species will provide more permutations, questionable principles, raging argument, and incomprehensible court opinions than any other
scheme of land use regulation. The fun has already begun, perhaps
nowhere as profoundly as in Washington State's Supreme Court, the
United States Claims Court, and the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Two of the most significant recent cases on takings have arisen in
the context of wetlands regulations. In Loveladies Harbor v. United
States (Loveladies II)," the claims court awarded a developer
$2,658,000, plus interest, after a development permit was denied on
12.5 acres of land. On the same day that Loveladies II was decided,
July 23, 1990, the same judge awarded a mining company $1,029,000,
plus interest, after a permit to mine limestone was refused for 98 acres
in Florida in Florida Rock Industries v. United States (Florida Rock
I).19

In an analogous environmental takings dispute the same judge
who decided Loveladies II and Florida Rock II awarded the owners of
a coal deposit over $60 million, plus interest, after finding that the
enactment of the Surface Mining Coal Reclamation Act (SMCRA),
when applied to specific coal deposits, was itself a taking, in Whitney
12. See infra Part VIII.
13. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
14. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
15. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
16. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
17. See, e.g., Berger, supra note it; see also David R. Mandelker & Michael M.
Berger, A Plea to Allow the Federal Courts to Clarify the Law of Regulatory Takings,
42 LAND USE LAW & ZONING DIGEST 3 (1990); Jan G. Laitos, Regulation of Natural
Resources Use and Development in Light of the "New" Takings Clause, 34 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1-1 (1988).
18. 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990).
19. 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990).
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Benefits v. United States.2" On appeal, the Federal Circuit unhesitatingly affirmed and emphasized the vitality of takings jurisprudence in
the modern era of environmental protection.2'
Finally, Connecticut's Supreme Court recently held that it would
find a taking if a property owner, who had a reasonable expectation of
developing in a wetland, could prove that the state prevented economically viable use of the wetland.22 And in Michigan, a trial court recently awarded $90 million in damages and interest
to oil companies
23
prohibited from drilling in the Nordhouse Dunes.
This article will examine very briefly the basic principles of the
law of takings, focusing on the most commonly articulated tests for
finding (or not finding) a taking through the regulation of property,
and will attempt to summarize the unifying principles of the law of
takings in relation to the regulation of wetlands, endangered species,
and other environmental concerns. In addition, trends from various
states will be reviewed.
This article will conclude that there is no special wetland, habitat,
or other environmental exception to the law of takings. Public burdens, including the cost of environmental regulation, should be borne
by the public as a whole. Under federal law, a taking may be found in
three circumstances. First, if a particular regulation limits property
rights and does not substantially advance a legitimate governmental
interest, there is a taking. Second, if a regulation totally destroys the
value of property, there is a taking. Finally, if property is partially
destroyed, there could be a taking depending on the nature of the regulation and the degree of economic impact.
Some state courts, however, have adopted doctrines that arguably
do not harmonize well with federal law. For example, Washington
State cases have held that invalidation, not compensation, is the appropriate remedy when a regulation fails to advance a legitimate governmental interest. Other states have found that there is no inherent
right to alter the character of land (from wetland to upland) and thus
no taking when property owners are prevented from undertaking such
conversions. It is this conflict between some states and federal law
that will engage the courts in the years ahead.

20. 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989), aff'd, 926 F.2d 1169 (1991), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 406

(1991). This case is to be contrasted with the purely facial and/or federal jurisdictional
challenges to the reclamation statute. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (SMCRA upheld against challenges based on Commerce Clause, 10th Amendment, and 5th Amendment grounds. Also no taking found
because facial attack insufficient to show that any particular coal deposit taken); Hodel
v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (jurisdictional challenge to farmland provisions of SMCRA upheld against similar jurisdictional challenges).
21. Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1177 n.10.

22. Gil v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Agency, 593 A.2d 1368, 1373-74 (Conn.
1991). See infra note 321 and accompanying text.
23. Michigan Plans Appeal of $90 Million Award, supra note 7.
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VERY BRIEF SURVEY OF FEDERAL WETLAND AND ENDANGERED
SPECIES LAWS

Two areas of environmental concern have a particularly high potential to collide with the law of takings: the protection of wetlands
and the preservation of endangered species.24 The federal government
and many states have comprehensive regulatory schemes to protect
wetlands and endangered species. This section will briefly describe the
relevant federal regulatory schemes.

A.

Wetlands and Section 404 of the Clean Water Act

Section 404 of the Clean Water Act governs "dredge and fill" activities in "all waters of the United States.""e In a clamshell, no person may "dredge and fill" waters of the United States, which include
wetlands, without a "dredge and fill" permit from the United States
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). 26 The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has regulatory oversight and may veto a permit. 27 Either agency may enforce violations of the statute, and may assess civil
fines of up to $25,000 per day, per violation plus criminal penalties of
mandatory incarceration plus fines ranging from $25,000 for negligent
first offenses to $100,000 for knowing second offenses.2
1. What Are "Waters of the United States?"
Wetlands are defined as "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a
prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil
conditions. Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and
similar areas. "28

24. It is the profound impact on the ability of people to use real estate that creates conflict under these two statutes. See, e.g., Keith Schneider, Environmental Laws
Face A Stiff Test From Landowners, N.Y. TIMES, January 20, 1992, at Al.
25. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988). For a comprehensive treatise on the
law of wetlands, see WILLIAM WANT, LAW OF WETLANDS REGULATION (hereinafter WETLANDS REGULATION) (1989). The relevant regulatory authority for wetlands is found at
Corps' regulations 33 C.F.R. § 320 (1991), and EPA regulations 40 C.F.R. § 230 (1991)
(also known as the "Section 404(b)(1) guidelines for specification of disposal sites for
dredged or fill material"). In addition, the Corps has issued numerous regulatory guidance letters, collected at 54 Fed. Reg. 2414 (1989). Finally, the Corps, EPA, and other
agencies have entered into numerous memoranda of agreement regarding wetlands regulations, see, e.g., WETLANDS REGULATION § 6.11 and Memorandum of Agreement,
supra note 4.
26. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988); 33 C.F.R. §§ 320, 384 (1991).
27. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (1988).
28. 33 U.S.C.S § 1319(d), (c)(3) (Supp. 1991). See also UNITED STATES ARMY
CORPS OF ENGINEERS, REGULATORY GUIDANCE LETTER 90-09, WETLANDS ENFORCEMENT
INITIATIVE, reprinted in 54 Fed. Reg. 2414 (1989).

29. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (1991).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol27/iss2/4

8

Burling: Property Rights, Endangered Species, Wetlands, and Other Critters
1992

REGULATORY TAKINGS

Until Congress prohibited its use,30 a much more detailed and
comprehensive definition was found in the Federal Manual for Identifying and Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands (Manual) prepared
by the Corps, EPA, United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and the
Soil Conservation Service.' Under the 1989 Manual, a wetland did
not have to look wet, or even damp, for it to be defined as a wetland."
Property owners became furious over the breadth of the wetlands definition and convinced the administration to propose changes.3 3 Because the next version of the manual will determine whether or not
millions of acres of "borderline" wetlands are to be regulated, it is a
safe assumption that it will profoundly affect the degree to which private property owners sue the federal government for takings damages.
Agencies interpret their Clean Water Act jurisdiction over "waters of the United States" to include navigable waters, tributaries
thereto, all wetlands adjacent to navigable waterways and their
tributaries, 34 and possibly artificially created wetlands.3 As for "isolated wetlands," which include prairie potholes, vernal pools, and
other wetlands not associated with or flowing into other waters, the
Corps asserts jurisdiction through the Commerce Clause; i.e., if a migratory duck might land in it, it affects interstate commerce."

30. See Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1992, 105 Stat. 510,
518 (1991).
31. U-S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. ET AL., FEDERAL MANUAL FOR IDENTIFYING AND DELINEATING JURISDICTIONAL WETLANDS (hereinafter MANUAL). The MANUAL was published in 1989 and is available from the Corps and EPA.
32. Id. at § 2.9(1)(B) at 7.
33. Proposals to amend the MANUAL were published at 56 Fed. Reg. 40,446 (1991),
which would make wetlands more "wet" (soil would have to be saturated for at least 21
days at the surface instead of only 7 days 18 inches below the surface). See, e.g., Warren Brookes, The Strange Case of the Glancing Geese, FORBES, Sept. 2, 1991, at 104;
Bush Draws Environmentalists' Anger with Wetlands Proposal, L.A TIMES, Aug. 11,
1991, at Al; Michael Weisskopf, EPA Defense of Wetlands Fuels New Threats, WASH.
POST, July 18, 1991, at A15; Timothy Noah, U.S. Panel on Housing Costs Targets
Wetlands Rules, Rent Control in Report, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1991, at A5E; Marianne
Lavelle, Even the Deserts Are Wet; Wetlands: The New Battle Cry in Washington,
NAT'L L. J., 1, 24 (1990). See also ADVISORY COMMISSION ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO
AFFORDABLE HOUSING. "NOT IN MY BACK YARD"

REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE

HOUSING, at 4-3 to 4-7 (1991) (hereinafter BACK YARD).
34. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 123-24 (1985).
35. Compare Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, ill S. Ct. 1089 (1991) (found jurisdiction over artificially created wetlands)
with United States v. City of Fort Pierre, 747 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1984) (no jurisdiction
over artificial wetlands created by the Corps).
36. What has become known as the "glancing duck" test of federal wetlands jurisdiction was first articulated in a September 15, 1985, internal EPA memorandum from
Francis Blake, General Counsel, to R. Sanderson, Office of External Affairs (available
from Pacific Legal Foundation). This assertion of jurisdiction was repudiated in an
unpublished opinion, 885 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1989) (table) (text of the opinion can be
found in 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,008), but the Corps and EPA continue
to assert jurisdiction in other circuits. See UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
404
JURISDICTION OVER ISOLATED WATERS IN LIGHT OF TABB LAKES V. UNITED STATES, memAGENCY AND UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY. CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION

orandum dated Jan. 19, Jan. 24, 1990 (available from Pacific Legal Foundation). The
Supreme Court expressly declined to address this jurisdictional issue in Riverside
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What Is -Dredge and Fill?"

Regulated "dredge and fill" activities include virtually any activity on a wetland where material is moved. Placing clean fill into a

wetland, such as for a road or home pad, is "dredge and fill." ' 37 Dig-

ging a ditch is "dredge and fill" when the ditch spoil is tossed next to
the ditch." Intensive farming can be "dredge and fill" when the
"reach" of the wetlands is diminished.3 9 In fact, virtually any activity
which moves dirt around in a wetland is considered to be "dredge and
fill" activity.4" An activity need not "pollute" for it to be regulated.4 1
3.

What Is a "404 Permit?"

Before a person can "dredge and fill," a permit must be obtained
from the Corps of Engineers.4" If a wetland is filled without a Section
404 permit, an "after-the-fact" permit must be obtained."3 Removal of
the unlawful fill is usually a precondition for obtaining an after-thefact permit.4 4 Failure to obtain a permit
for dredge and fill activities
45
may result in substantial penalties.

If a permit is denied, the denial may be appealed. 48 A final denial
of a permit may result in a taking. 47 The mere determination that a
Buyview Homes, 474 U.S. at 131 n.8, a case where it found federal jurisdiction over
"adjacent" wetlands. See also United States v. Larkins, 852 F.2d 189, 193-94 (6th Cir.
1988) (Merritt, C. J., concurring) (noting that Riverside expressly declined to consider
jurisdiction over nonadjacent wetlands and noting possible takings implications). See
also Brookes, supra note 33.
37. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d),(e),(f) (1991).
38. Id. at § 323.2(f).
39. A limited exemption applies for some agriculture and silviculture. See 33
U.S.C. § 1344(f) (1988); 33 C.F.R. 323.4(a)(1) (1991); ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, REGULATORY GUIDANCE LETTER 90-5, reprinted in 56 Fed. Reg. 2408 (1991); but see United
States v. Akers, 785 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 828 (1986) (limiting
agricultural exemption), and United States v. Huebner, 752 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 817 (1985) (limiting exemption).
40. Id.
41. See Florida Rock I, 8 Cl. Ct.:at 172 (Judge Kozinski holding that regulated
mining activity would not have caused pollution); Loveladies I, 15 Cl. Ct. at 389
(Judge Smith holding that the residential development would cause even less potential
of "pollution" than Florida Rock).
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1988). For minor activities, blanket "nationwide" permits
are available. 33 C.F.R. § 330.5(a) (1991). Revisions to the nationwide permits are being contemplated. 56 Fed. Reg. 2408 (1991). The EPA may veto the issuance of a Section 404 permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c).
43. 33 C.F.R. § 326.3(e) (1991).
44. Id.
45. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
46. Suit can be brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701
(1988), and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) (federal question jurisdiction); see WETLANDS REGULATION, supra note 25 at § 9.0111]. See also Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. Baldwin, Civ.
No. 82-1948 (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 1984), aff'd without opinion, 751 F.2d 376 (3d Cir. 1984).
47. See Loveladies II, 21 Cl. Ct. 153; Florida Rock 11, 21 Cl. Ct. 161. But see
Deltona Corporation v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (no taking found);
Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (no taking found); Ciampitti v.
United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 318 (1991) (Ciampitti II) (no taking found). Deltona and
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property is wetland, however, is not a taking."'
B.

The Endangered Species Act

Of all the federal environmental protection statutes the Endangered Species Act (ESA)4" is the most comprehensive." Economics
may not be considered in the process through which a species is listed
as threatened or endangered.5 Only after a species is listed may economics be considered in critical habitat designation,52 the consideration of habitat conservation plans, 53 or in the cabinet level review
committee deliberations. 4 The ESA has created intense controversy
when applied to scenarios ranging from stopping the Tellico Dam because of snail darters, 55 to restricting shrimping in the gulf (to protect
sea turtles),5" to threatening water supplies in California (Delta
Smelt), 57 and most controversially to the threats of severe job losses in
the Pacific Northwest logging industry because of the spotted owl. 58
As a result there have been calls to reform the Act during its 1992
reauthorization. 9
The ESA provides a mechanism whereby the Fish and Wildlife
Service, on its own initiative or pursuant to a petition from a member
of the public, will list a species as "threatened" or "endangered. 6 0
Jentgen were decided prior to the 1987 Supreme Court trilogy of takings cases. Deltona may be best explained by noting that its main holding is that the imposition of a
permit requirement is not by itself a taking-the permit first must be applied for and
denied, leaving the property owner without a viable use of property. Jentgen found
that a denial of a permit is not a taking of the property when significant value remains
in the property (the land in question was still partially developable). In Ciampitti II,
no taking was found because the property owner did not have a reasonable expectation
of being able to develop his property. These cases are discussed in more detail in Part
VI, infra.
48. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 127.
49. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988). Relevant regulations

are found at 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.1-17.108, 217.1-217.4, and Parts 402-453 (1991). For a
concise review of the Act, see Constance A. Brooks and W. Hugh O'Riordan, The ESA:
A Practitioner'sPoint of View, 4 NAT'L RESOURCES. & ENV'T, No. 4 at 29 (1989).
50.
51.
tions ...
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
16 U.S.C. § 1533(a), (b) (1) (a) (1988). "The Secretary shall make determinasolely on the basis of the best scientific or commercial data." Id.
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
Id. at § 1539(a).
Id. at § 1536(e)-(h).
Tennessee Valley Authority, 437 U.S. 153.
See infra note 59.
Dennis Pfaff, Threatened Fish Meet Prized Substance, S.F. DAILY J.,Jan. 16,

1992, at 5.
58. See supra note 10. See also BACK YARD, supra note 33, at 4-7 to 4-11.
59. See Review & Outlook, Species Act, Endangered, WALL ST.J., Jan. 15, 1992 at
A 14; Mann and Plumer, supra note 5; Rudy Abramson, Wildlife Act: Shield or
Sword?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1990, at Al; But see Kurt Zimmerman, Politics and Preservation: The Endangered Species Act and the Northern Spotted Owl, 18 ECOLOGY. L.

Q. 105 (1991).
60. 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1988); 50 C.F.R. Part 424 (1991). Emergency listings also are
available, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(7), which are extremely difficult to challenge. See Tony A.
Sullins, Note, Endangered Species Act-Judicial Review of an Emergency Listing-A
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The Fish and Wildlife Service, as a matter of law, may not consider
social and economic factors in the listing process." The act defines an
endangered species as: "[A]ny species which is in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range other than a species
of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a
pest." 2 A "threatened" species is one that has a significant potential
of becoming endangered.63 Both plants and animals may be listed although endangered animals receive a greater level of protection than
endangered plants." As a practical matter, there is little difference in
the regulatory impact of listing a species as either "threatened" or
"endangered.""
Important consequences result from the listing of a species. Federal agencies are under an affirmative duty to avoid actions that would
jeopardize the species.6 In addition, activities on private property
may be curtailed in order to avoid harming the species. 7 Thus, both
private property owners and public land managers must be fully
aware of the requirements of the ESA when any listed species may be
affected by their activities.
1.

A Short Word About a Different Species of Takings

Once a species has been listed as endangered or threatened, it is
unlawful to "take" that species. "The term 'take' means to harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to
attempt to engage in any such conduct."6 8 Penalties for violation of
the ESA include fines of up to $50,000 per violation and mandatory
incarceration. The regulations amplify the definition of "take" by in-

Wasteful Allocation of Resources?, 26

LAND & WATER L. REV. 619 (1991).
61. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(a) (1991). "The Secretary shall make determinations
...solely on the basis of the best scientific or commercial data." Id.
62. Id. at § 1532(6).
63. Id. at § 1532(20).
64. Compare id. at § 1538(1) with § 1538(2) (prohibition on endangered plants
limited to removal).
65. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (making it unlawful to take endangered
species) with 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (1991) (extending the prohibition to all threatened
species). This extends the amount of property directly impacted by the Act. No court
has addressed whether the regulatory extension to threatened species exceeds the statutory plan.
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988). 50 C.F.R. § 402 (1991). All federal agencies must
consult with the Secretary of Interior on any agency action likely to jeopardize a listed
species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(4). Biological statements must be prepared by the Fish
and Wildlife Service. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02(d). The biological opinion will determine
whether or not the proposed agency action jeopardizes the listed species. 50 C.F.R. §
402.14(h)(3). If a "jeopardy" biological opinion is issued, the opinion shall include reasonable and prudent alternatives, if any, Id. If the proposed action does not jeopardize
the species, or if a suggested alternative is available, the project may proceed if an
"incidental take" statement is prepared. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1539.
68. Id. at § 1532(19).
69. Id. at § 1540(a), (b).
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cluding any action that harms the habitat of an endangered species. 70
Rhetorical confusion should be avoided by remembering that a "taking" in the context of the ESA refers to potential harm to animals,
plants, or their habitat, but a "taking" of property refers to the deprivation of individual property rights.
2.

The Impacts of the Endangered Species Act

Congress has modified the ESA in the past to ameliorate its inflexibility. When it was used, for example, to stop the construction of
the Tellico Dam, no balancing of economic losses against the value of
the snail darter was permitted.7" As a result of that case, Congress
amended the ESA.7 2 The amendments provided limited methods
through which activities may proceed in conjunction with endangered
species. For example, agency action may proceed under Section 7 of
the Act,7" by obtaining an "incidental takings" statement. 4 Likewise,
individuals stymied by the Act may submit a "habitat conservation
plan" for approval. 75 If approved, an "incidental takings permit" may
be issued. 76 Finally, the President and Congress may invoke a special
cabinet-level committee that has the power to override the act in special circumstances.77 This committee, known both as the "God Squad"
and "God Committee," has almost never been invoked and is of little

70. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3(c); Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land and Natural Resources, 639
F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming order to remove (kill) feral sheep in order to protect
the habitat of the Palla bird).
71. Tennessee Valley Authority, 437 U.S. at 184 (purpose of statute is to "halt
and reverse the trend towards species extinction, whatever the cost").
72. George Cameron Coggins and K. Russell, Beyond Shooting Snail Darters in
Pork Barrels: Endangered Species and Land Use in America, 70 GEO. L J_ 1433, 147677 (1982); Jared des Rosiers, The Exemption Process Under the Endangered Species
Act: How the "God Squad" Works and Why (ESA Process), 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
825, 826 (1991). When the amendments proved inadequate to allow dam construction,
Congress passed a special appropriation to allow the dam construction to proceed.
VICTOR J. YANNACONE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS) § 13.21 n.90 at 1883 (Supp. 1988).
73. Codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1988).
74. See supra note 66.
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1988). See Timothy Beatley Bentley, Regional Approaches to Wildlife Habitat Conservation, URB. LAND, Aug. 1991 at 36-39.
76. Id. In the Mojave Desert, for example, property owners are subject to a plan
that permits home building in exchange for a fee of $1,950 per acre which will be used
to purchase habitat for the Stephens' Kangaroo Rat. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE ET. AL., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-

MENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT; SECTION (10)(A) PERMIT TO ALLOW INCIDENTAL TAKE OF THE ENDANGERED STEPHENS' KANGAROO RAT IN RIVERSIDE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA (1990); see also BACK YARD, supra note 33 at 4-10. Obtaining such a permit is a

complicated task. See Robert D. Thornton, Takings under Endangered Species Act
Section 9, 4 NAT'L RESOURCES & ENV'T, No. 4 at 7-9, 50 (Spring, 1990).
77. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(h) (1988) (subsection (h) explains that to be approved
despite a potential harm to a listed species the committee must find that the project
has no reasonable alternatives, has benefits that outweigh alternatives, is in the public
interest, is of regional or national significance, and does not already involve an irreversible commitment of resources).
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practical consequence."'
Today the Endangered Species Act is being used to halt logging
in old growth forests in the Pacific Northwest.7" In January, 1992, the
"God Squad" held a month-long hearing in Portland, Oregon, notable
mostly for the intense amount of controversy generated with criticism
from both the timber industry and environmental factions.80 A decision may be rendered by spring, 1992.81 In the meantime, the federal
government and state governments in the region are all adopting
emergency regulations for owl protection that will curtail the logging
of old growth timber.2 Although no lawsuits have been filed yet, the
Pacific Northwest may become fertile ground for bringing Fifth
Amendment takings claims against the federal government for
prohibitions of endangered species "takings" on private forest lands.
Test cases can be expected if landowners are prohibited from logging
on private property because of the owl-especially in cases where logging is the only economic value of the property.8 3
III.
A.

SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF TAKINGS

The Nature and Importance of Private Property Rights

The arguments in favor of environmental regulation have been
repeatedly articulated in the mass media. But, central to any debate
over the clash between environmental regulation and property rights
is an understanding of the intrinsic value of a system of government
that protects property rights.

78. The committee was invoked for the Tellico Dam controversy, but it decided
not to authorize dam construction. ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS, supra note 72, § 13.21 n.
90 at 1883; des Rosiers, supra note 72, at 846 (at the same time it met and decided to
allow the completion of the Gray Rocks Dam on the Laramie River). Id. at 846 citing
ENDANGERED SPECIES COMMITTEE DECISION ON GRAY ROCKS DAM AND RESERVOIR APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION (Feb. 7, 1979).

79. See supra note 10.
80. See, e.g. Kathie Durbin, Expert Sees "Precipitous"Owl Decline, OREGONIAN,
Jan. 28, 1992 at B1 (owl may become extinct even if logging halted); Kathie Durbin,
Timber Attorneys Allowed More Time, OREGONIAN, Jan. 24, 1992, at EI (major conservation groups allege improprieties in hearings); Kathie Durbin, Pro-Timber Group
Fears Shut Out by "God Squad", OREGONIAN, Jan. 18, 1992, at D5; Editorial-God
Squad Confusion, OREGONIAN, Jan. 12, 1992, at C8 (administration undercuts credibility); and Kathie Durbin, "God Squad" Won't Resolve Problems, OREGONIAN, Dec. 5,
1991, at C7 (foregone conclusion that the decision will be appealed),
81. Unless other arrangements are made, the Secretary has 140 days from the
time a decision is made to hold a hearing to submit a report with recommendations to
the Committee. 50 C.F.R. § 452.08 (1991). The Committee then has 30 days to render
its decision. 50 C.F.R. § 453.03(a). Submittal of the report has been delayed. See
Roberta Virich, Lujan Delays Decision on Timber Sales in Oregon, OREGONIAN, Mar.
21, 1992, at B01.
82. See supra note 10.
83. See infra Part IV.
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1.

Property Rights Are an Essential Liberty-an Academic View

Those who advocate the protection of property rights follow the
Lockean view that property rights are as essential to liberty as are the
freedoms of speech, religion, due process, and so on. To oversimplify,
this theory holds that citizens enter into society and government for
84
the purpose of protecting their property and selves. But when government abuses the property of its citizens, the government is tyrannical and is owed no allegiance by its citizens. Without a government
85
deserving allegiance, all liberties are at risk. Additionally, private
form and maintain a
to
citizens
for
an
incentive
seen
as
is
property
8
just government-a government that respects all liberties. " Finally,
the protection of private property rights is inherent in any constitutional system that seeks to protect the rights of the few from the passions of the many."7
An opposing view holds that the protection of private property
rights is most certainly not an essential liberty (compared to the other
liberties protected in the Constitution) and is at best an anachronistic
impediment to an efficient and humane government.8 8 Or, in the
words of a 1973 task force led by now EPA Administrator William
84. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT § 124 (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1988).
85. Id. at §§ 201, 222 ("[wihenever legislators endeavor to take away, and destroy
the property of the People . . . they put themselves into a state of War with the
People, who are there upon absolved from any further obedience" (emphasis in
original)).
86. FREDERICH A. HAYEK,THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 104 (1944, 1972).
87. For a view of one of the more radical advocates of private property rights, see
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
[hereinafter TAKINGS) (1985); see also Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection (hereinafter Takings Descent), 1987 SuP. CT.REV, 1; Norman Karlin, Back to

the Future: From Nollan to Lochner, 17 Sw. U. L. REV. 627 (1988); Gideon Kanner,
Condemnation Blight: Just How Just Is Just Compensation?, 48 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
765 (1973). For a market theory of private property and takings, see Lawrence Blume
and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72 CAL.
L. REV.569 (1984). See also Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. 627, 657 (1829) ("government
can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights of property are left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body, without any restraint .... The rights of
personal liberty and private property should be held sacred").
88. See, e.g., Note, The Constitutionality of Rent Control Restrictions on Property Owners' Dominion Interests, 100 HARV.L.REV. 1067 (1987). For an academic economic theory that argues that the protection of private property rights promotes economic inefficiency, see William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and
Michelman: Comments on Economic Interpretations of "Just Compensation" Law, 17
J. LEGAL STUD. 269 (1988). In Holmes Rolston, III, Property Rights and Endangered
Species, 61 U. COLO. L REV. 283, 288, 304 (1981), professor of philosophy Rolston argues that there is no moral or legal right to "superkill" (to make extinct) a species
through wasteful killing, and that property rights are "lesser liberties" which must be
tempered by larger societal rights. See also Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police
Power, 74 YALE L. J.36 (1964) (notably rejecting the theory that diminution in value
leads to a taking); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81
YALE L. J. 149 (1971) ("public rights," a.k.a. the police power, limits the finding of
takings); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1178 (1967) (it
would be inefficient to compensate every burden).
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Reilly:
Many [judicial] precedents are anachronistic now that land is
coming to be regarded as a basic natural resource to be protected
and conserved . ...

It is time that the U.S. Supreme Court re-

examine its precedents that seem to require a balancing of public
benefit against land value loss . . . and declare that, when the
protection of natural, cultural or aesthetic resources or the assurance of orderly development are involved, a mere loss in land
value is no justification for invalidating the regulation of land
use (emphasis added) (brackets in original)."
2. Property
Constitution

Rights

Are

Protected

and

Favored

by

the

Academic debate aside, the Supreme Court recognizes the continued vitality of private property rights and acknowledges that the protection of property is a fundamental liberty. For example:
[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is
a false one. Property does not have rights. People have rights.
The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less
than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a "personal" right ....

In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists

between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in
property. Neither could have meaning without the other.9 0
3. Courts May Show a New Willingness to Protect Private Property in the Face of Regulation
The Supreme Court may be more respectful of property rights
today than at any time since the new deal. In United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 1 the Supreme Court established an apparent
dichotomy between applying strict scrutiny (read substantive due process and little deference) for liberties such as speech and religion, but
less scrutiny (read relaxed due process and extreme deference) to the
regulation of economic rights. In plain English, the Court was indicating that it would quickly overturn laws and regulations that affect
speech, religion, and (in later years) discrimination and privacy.9 2 It
would, however, usually uphold regulations affecting property.23
89. See Brookes, supra note 33, at 112 (quoting William Reilly); but see Hendler
v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("the importance of exclusive
ownership . . . is now understood as essential to economic development, and to the
avoidance of the wasting of resources found under common property systems").
90. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972).
91. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
92. See Karlin, supra note 87, at 629. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(substantive due process applied to abortion regulation).
93. See Karlin, supra note 87, at 629.
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In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,94 however, the Court
indicated that it may once again be prepared to entertain a heightened level of scrutiny for property rights: "the regulation [must] 'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state interest' sought to be
achieved. [It is not enough] ... that 'the State "could rationallyhave
decided" that the measure adopted might achieve the State's objective.'" (Emphasis in original.) 95 By adopting a heightened scrutiny
test, courts should be willing to look at the actual nexus between a
regulation and an activity's supposed harm-an element that may
have dramatic effects on the regulation of wetlands and endangered
species. The Supreme Court's decision to decide three property rights
cases in the 1991 term may accelerate this trend."6
4. Property Rights Have a Vitality and Origin Independent of
the Constitution
While property rights are constitutionally protected, they are not
constitutionally created: "[W]e are mindful of the basic axiom that
'[piroperty interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather,
they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law.' , Thus, for example, if a governmental entity creates a property right subject to certain restrictions, such as an easement for access to navigable waterways, the regulatory enforcement of that restriction should not rise to the level of a taking. But, if an
unencumbered property right is created by state law, then the subsequent imposition of new regulatory constraints would more likely be a
taking.9
Theories abound today that virtually all property is subject to a
"public trust."9 9 Originally designed as a mechanism to protect public

94. 483 U.S. 825 (1987); see infra Part III(B)(3).
95. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3; Azul Pacifico v. City of Los Angeles, 948 F.2d 575
(9th Cir. 1991) (ends and means must have close fit). See also Karlin, supra note 87, at
629-31 & 670-71. But see Commercial Builders of Northern California v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991) (the Ninth Circuit finds Nollan does not
mean what it says: "we are not persuaded that Nollan materially changes the level of
scrutiny"), petition for cert. in process of being filed; Richard L. Settle, Regulatory
Taking Doctrine in Washington: Now You See It, Now You Don't, 12 U PUGET SOUND
L. REV 339, 380 n.243 (Nollan applies only to exactions; Washington state court in
error holding otherwise).
96. See supra note 8.
97. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984).
98. See infra note 119.
99. See, e.g., Rolston, supra note 88 at 291; Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution,
Property Rights, and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 257, 269 (1990).
But see James L. Huffman, Avoiding the Takings Clause Through the Myth of Public
Rights: The Public Trust and Reserved Rights Doctrines at Work, 3 J. LAND USE &
ENVTL. L 171 (1987); James L. Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A
Comment on the Public Trust Writings of Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning and
Johnson, 63 DENY. U. L. REV. 565 (1986).
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access to navigable waterways,'0 0 academics in recent years have developed an argument that the doctrine must "evolve" into an all-encompassing ecological easement on all private property-which would
supposedly limit the reach of the takings doctrine.' Yet, if "existing
rules and understandings" are relied upon, such a transmogrification
of the public trust doctrine should logically have no ability to negate
the existence of a regulatory taking.0 2 If the property right was created without being subject to the modern expanded public trust, then
any later imposition of the newly defined public trust carries with it
significant takings implications. Thus it is necessary to know what is
and what is not included in the "bundle of sticks" of a particular
property right before it can be argued that the right has or has not
been taken by a governmental regulation.
5.

Protected "Property" Includes an Array of Personal Rights

A fundamental property right is the right "to possess, use and
dispose of it.' 0 3 The right to use property is a literal one, to which
government cannot itself claim ownership. As stated in Nollan, "the
right to build on one's own property-even though its exercise can be
subjected to legitimate permitting requirements-cannot remotely be
described as a 'governmental benefit.' "1' Likewise, the right to exclude is fundamentalIoa This doctrine has led to such obvious results
as giving landowners the ability to prevail against government demands for public access to private property.0 6 As once rural lands become suburbanized, property owners are often required to maintain
land as "open space," "wetland," or "habitat conservation zones." In
such cases a de facto public park has been created from the private
property-although the governmental entity involved does not demand an actual deed transfer as in Nollan.0 7 If a property owner can-

100. The public trust doctrine was simply a shorthand way of saying that private
individuals could not impose a stranglehold on the public's use of and access to navigable waterways. Thus, Illinois and Chicago could not sell the waterfront without first
accommodating the interest of the public in access to the commons (navigable waterways). See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); see also Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (noting the doctrine not necessarily confined
to navigable waters).
101. See supra note 99.
102. See Hughes v. State of Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1967) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("a State cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition
against taking property without due process of law by the simple device of asserting
retroactively that the property it has taken never existed at all").
103. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)
(quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
104. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2 (emphasis added).
105. "[W]e hold that the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation." Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 179-80 (1979). Accord Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433.
106. Nollan, 483 U.S. 825; Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 179-80.
107. Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
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not build on the new park-like property, and it becomes therefore impractical for the landowner to adequately control trespassers (a
problem exacerbated by the surrounding suburbanization), it is arguable that the right to exclude has been compromised, giving rise to a
taking. To the author's knowledge, this argument has not yet been
squarely presented to the courts.
B. The 1987 Trilogy-the Supreme Court's Latest Words on
Takings
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court issued three major
opinions on the law of takings. Some familiarity of these cases is essential to an understanding of the modern law of takings.
1. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis"

s

For property owners, Keystone is the Mr. Hyde to the Dr. Jekyll
of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.' 9 In Pennsylvania Coal, an opinion by Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court overturned Pennsylvania's
Kohler Act which prevented coal companies from mining if the mining would cause surface structures to collapse." ' Pennsylvania Coal
was a landmark, because it was the first major case demonstrating
that a regulation which goes "too far" may be a taking."' Keystone,
on the other hand, held that a very similar mining regulation was not
a taking.
An essential element to both Keystone and Pennsylvania Coal is
the fact that under Pennsylvania law the "support estate" was considered to be a separate property right, one which could be bought and
paid for by the coal companies along with the mineral rights in coal.'
However, after a few years of allowing the transfer of support estates,
Pennsylvania surface owners began to have second thoughts about
their previous sales of the support estAte and, outnumbering the coal
companies, persuaded the Pennsylvania legislature to outlaw coal
mining that would destroy the surface estate under buildings." 3
108. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).

109. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
110. Id. at 414.
111. Id. at 415. Prior to Pennsylvania Coal, courts generally did not recognize
that a taking could occur through an exercise of the police power. See, e.g., Florida
Rock 1, 791 F.2d at 900; Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1177 n.10. But with the rise of
the regulatory state, the outcome of Pennsylvania Coal became perhaps inevitable.
See John M. Groen, Regulatory Takings and the Public Safety/Nuisance Exception:
Sorting out the Keystone Debacle, in press [hereinafter Groen] (available on request
from Pacific Legal Foundation).
112. 260 U.S. at 412. A "support estate" is the right to a stable land surface. Id. If
a coal company purchases both the mineral and support estates, it has the theoretical
right to mine all the available coal under the surface, even if that means the surface
will collapse. In such a case, the surface estate owner retains the surface rights, albeit a
less stable surface at a lower elevation.
113. For a discussion of the nature of property rights and majority rule in the
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In 1922, the Supreme Court found the regulation to have gone
"too far," and to be an unconstitutional taking of private property
rights without compensation." 4 The law was dead and buried. But in
response to renewed public pressure, the Pennsylvania legislature
passed a virtually identical statute, this time called the 1966 Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (Bituminous Act),
the Act that was ultimately challenged in Keystone.
Between 1922 and 1987, however, a veritable cottage industry had
sprung up among legal academicians debating the merits and significance of Pennsylvania Coal. To those who perceived it as a threat to
the government's ability to regulate with impunity, valiant attempts
were made to explain the case away. In a nutshell, they argued that
Pennsylvania Coal was (1) dicta, (2) not an impediment to government regulation or prohibition for "nuisances," and (3) limited to its
facts. "5
That the Pennsylvania legislature passed the Bituminous Act,
which so closely resembles the discredited Kohler Act, demonstrates
that legislative bodies consciously or unconsciously will continue to
test the limits of their regulatory authority, even in the light of contrary precedent. That the Third Circuit upheld the Bituminous Act' 8
shows that the courts are not in agreement as to where these limits
may be. In light of the decision in Pennsylvania Coal, it was not surprising that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Keystone, presumably because at least a few of the justices wanted to iron out the
differences between where Pennsylvania Coal and the Third Circuit
put these limits." 7
Alas, for the advocates of private property rights, it was not to be.
Writing for a five justice majority, Justice Stevens distinguished
Pennsylvania Coal almost into oblivion by finding a different legislative purpose for the new Act. He found that the Kohler Act had been
designed to protect only private rights (the support of privately
owned buildings) and as such took those rights from one set of property owners (the coal companies) and gave them to another set of
property owners (the surface estate owners). 1 ' Thus, the statute was
invalid because it took private property without just compensation.
In contrast, Stevens wrote that the 1966 Bituminous statute was
context of Keystone and Mahon, see Epstein, supra note 87, at 7-9.
114. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414-15 (1922).
115. See, e.g., William B. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057 (1980) (no compensation for regulations that do not enhance
the value of government owned property). Alternatively, takings theories were developed that were pretty much independent of the rationale of Pennsylvania Coal. See,
e.g., Sax, Takings and the Police Power, supra note 88; Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, supra note 88.
116. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Duncan, 771 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1985).
117. See, e.g., Amicus Brief of Pacific Legal Foundation, Keystone, 480 U.S. 470
(available on request from Pacific Legal Foundation).
118. 480 U.S. at 484-85.
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designed to protect public rights by guarding the public against collapsing buildings, schools, and the like."1 9 Having distinguished Pennsylvania Coal factually on the basis of its purpose, the Court was free
to analyze the 1966 law and determine that no taking resulted. The
Court found that the act was a valid exercise of the police power and
did not diminish the value of the coal or interfere with commercial
mining operations to such an extent as to cause a facial taking.'20
Despite the apparent setback to private property rights in Keystone, the case must be kept in perspective.'
The decision had only
the result of finding the Bituminous Act to be valid against a facial
attack. The court expressly left the possibility open that a coal owner
might be able to prove in an as-applied case that compensation is due
for a taking of a specifically identified deposit of coal.' 22 Thus, the key
principle of Justice Holmes' decision will remain intact for many
years: "The general rule, at least, is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking. '
2. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles' 24
Three months after Keystone, the Court in First Church strongly
reaffirmed the regulatory takings principle, pointing out that since at
least Pennsylvania Coal the Court has unhesitatingly applied the regulatory takings doctrine. Pennsylvania Coal invalidated the Kohler
Act-but it did not find that any compensation should be paid to the
coal owners for lost profits that they might have incurred during the
period of time the act was in effect. In fact, the Court never addressed
the issue of compensation. From that humble omission, the theory
grew that whenever a governmental entity passes a statute that unconstitutionally violates the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, the
only remedy is to invalidate the statute'2 5-and never pay money
119. Id. at 485-86. The validity of this distinction is troublesome in light of Justice Holmes' specific reference to "mining of coal under streets or cities." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414. While Holmes finds the Kohler Act to have been in error
because it gave property rights from one set of owners to another, the public-private
distinction is not readily apparent in that decision.
120. 480 U.S. at 495.
121. For two pointed criticisms of Keystone's attempt to distinguish Pennsylvania Coal, see Rehnquist's dissent in Keystone, 480 U.S. at 506, and Epstein, Takings
Descent, supra note 87, at 5-23.
122. 480 U.S. at 501 ("[tlhe record is devoid of any evidence on what percentage
of the purchased support estates . .. has been affected by the Act.").
123. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415; see supra text accompanying note 1.
124. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
125. This is to be contrasted to the situation where a statute takes property, but
state or federal law still provides a mechanism for compensation. Such a statute is
almost always constitutional. See, e.g., Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission,
494 U.S. 1 (1990) (holding the "Rails to Trails" Act constitutional because the Tucker
Act is available to pay compensation for whatever property rights in railroad right-ofway easements might be taken).
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damages for compensation-otherwise
there would be a "chilling ef12
fect" on regulators.
For example, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,' 27 the California Supreme Court adopted invalidation as the exclusive remedy for unconstitutional regulations. 12 When California again followed the no-compensation rule in San Diego Gas & Electric v. San Diego,'129 the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 3 0° But when the
Court found the case unripe, and avoided the merits, Justice Brennan
expressed his disgust with the abuse of the invalidation-only rule in a
stinging dissent.' He stated if the Court had reached the merits of
the regulation in question, and if the challenged regulation had been
found unconstitutional, then not only could the Court invalidate the
regulation, but it would find that the property owners would be entitled to compensation for a "temporary takings"-for the time during
which the unconstitutional law was in effect.3 2 Significantly, between
dissenting and concurring opinions, Brennan's133"temporary takings"
language commanded a majority of the Court.
The San Diego dissent sent the pro-government regulation fraternity into a dither,' and the pro-property rights advocates into a state
of heightened optimism.'33 It was against this background that a forest fire raged upstream from a campground for disabled children run
126. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 30 (Cal. 1979) ("inverse condemnation is an inappropriate and undesirable remedy in cases in which unconstitutional regulation is alleged"), aff'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). See also Settle, Regulatory
Taking Doctrine, supra note 95, at 391 (invalid regulations do not effect a "public
purpose" and therefore can never take property; invalidation is the only remedy
available).
127. 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979).
128. Id. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court refused to reach the merits
of the Agins case (which involved the denial of building permits) saying that the property owners, the Agins, must go back to their zoning board and try to get a different
housing development plan approved. Only when all possible plans allowing economic
use of the property had been denied would the "takings" issue be ripe for review. 447
U.S. at 262.
129. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 636-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132. Brennan cited to advice given at the 1974 annual conference of the National
Institute of Municipal Law Officers: "IF ALL ELSE FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE
REGULATION AND START OVER AGAIN." San Diego, 450 U.S. at 655 n.22. The
advice continued that because of California's invalidation-only remedy, that "even after trial and judgment" a city only had to change the regulation and "make it more
reasonable, more restrictive, or whatever, and everybody starts over again ....
See
how easy it is to be a City Attorney." Id.
133. Brennan was joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell in the dissent.
Justice Rehnquist concurred with the majority opinion because he believed the case
was not ripe, but indicated that he agreed with Justice Brennan's discussion of temporary takings. Id. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
134. See, e.g., Norman Williams, Jr., et al., The White River Junction Manifesto,
9 VT. L. REV. 193 (1984).
135. See, e.g., Gus Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse Condemnation and the
Fifth Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls,
15 RUTGERS L.J. 15 (1983) [hereinafter Bauman].
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by the First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale. As
often happens in California when vegetation is burned off steep
slopes, floods follow fire, and the campground was wiped out in a torrential deluge.' 36 But by the time the church applied for permission to
rebuild the campground, Los Angeles had passed an ordinance that
prohibited building in flood zones.' 37 Thus, the necessary permit was
denied. It was on these underwhelming facts that the church appealed
the denial all the way to the Supreme Court. As in Agins and San
Diego, it appeared that the case was not ripe because the church arguably had not yet exhausted its administrative remedies. Nevertheless, the Court ruled on the case, using it as a vehicle to solidify the
San Diego dissent's "temporary takings" doctrine. "
What the Court did not do was rule that the Los Angeles ordinance was unconstitutional. That issue was remanded. But the Court
did say that if on remand the statute was found unconstitutional,
then the church would be entitled to temporary takings compensation. 13 9 With First English the "chilling effect" rationale was scuttled
into oblivion-or at least into the State of Washington. 4"
3.

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission"'

Nollan deals with the constraints that "takings" law places on the
sort of conditions that government can place on development permits.
Understanding the Nollan doctrine is critical for developers faced
136. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 307 (1987).
137. Id.
138. Of some small significance in this case was the reappearance of Bonnie
Agins-who now more than ten years after applying for a permit still had not received
permission to build. Agins' attorneys urged the Court to make good its promise in San
Diego to make temporary takings compensable. See Amicus Brief of Ms. Bonnie Agins
in First Church, 482 U.S. 304 (available upon request from Pacific Legal Foundation).
At oral argument, Justice Marshall expressed particular interest in Ms. Agins' fate.
Telephone conference with Agins' attorney, Robert K. Best, Pacific Legal Foundation
(January 19, 1987).
139. First Church, 482 U.S. at 322. As it turned out, on remand the statute was
found to be a legitimate exercise of the police power designed to protect public health
and safety. There was, therefore, no taking, permanent or temporary, and the statute
remains in effect. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353, 1366 (1989), cert denied 493 U.S. 1056 (1990). But
see McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 676-77, 679 (9th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing the appeals court's notion that a deprivation of all use would not necessarily
give rise to a taking).
For an application of the temporary takings doctrine, see Yuba Natural Resources, Inc. v. United States, 821 F.2d 638 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See also Hendler v.
United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discusses the distinction between temporary takings in a regulatory takings context versus the nonutility of temporary takings doctrine in physical occupation cases where all significant invasions are takings).
140. See infra note 295 and accompanying text. The Washington Supreme Court
has resurrected this dead doctrine to once again avoid the payment of compensation
for unconstitutional statutes. See Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 787 P.2d 907
(Wash. 1990) cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990).
141. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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with difficult mitigation requirements imposed during the wetlands or
endangered species permitting processes.
In California, there are few things more sacred than the beach. In
1972 the voters of California established a mechanism for sweeping
The scheme ultimately resulted
protection of the California coast.'
in the creation of the California Coastal Commission (Commission),
which was given permit authority over all development activities on
the coast. In a short while, the Commission embarked on an ambitious
program of creating new public beaches, public access corridors to the
beach, and easements across private property.'4 2 The Commission,
under the guise of its police power, chose not to pay for any of these
improvements. Instead, it waited until a property owner sought a development permit-and then simply told the owner that the permit
was for sale-at the price of giving up some land for a public beach,
an access way, or whatever happened to be on the Commission's wish
list.",
When Marilyn and Patrick Nollan proposed replacing a ramshackle old beach bungalow with a two story family home more in line
with the neighborhood, they were not thrilled when the Coastal Commission demanded that they dedicate one-third of their property to
the state to be the first segment in a new park."' 5 After exhausting
their administrative remedies, the Nollans sued. 4" Eventually, the Supreme Court rejected the Commission's imposition of the "exaction"
requirement that the Nollans give up one-third of their property in
exchange for the building permit. Such an exaction, which would allow the public onto private property, would be a physical invasion and
invoke the Takings Clause.' 47
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia explained the law of regulatory conditions. He indicated that it might be perfectly acceptable for
a government agency to deny a development permit if the development were to have an adverse impact on the public "unless the denial
142. CAL. PUB. RE.S. CODE § 30000 (West 1986) Historical Note.
143. JOSEPH GUGHEMETTI & EUGENE D. WHEELER, THE TAKING, 36-39 (1981) (details regulatory abuses of California Coastal Commission).
144. Id.
145. The Nollans owned the land down to the mean high tide water mark. Nollan,
483 U.S. 825 (1987) (so did all their neighbors). What the Commission asked for was a
lateral (i.e., parallel to the shoreline) easement over the most seaward third of the
Nollans' property. Because their adjacent neighbors still owned their most seaward
property, the general public would not have been able to reach the new Nollan park
strip during high tide without trespassing on the neighbors' property. What the Commission was hoping for, obviously, was that the rest of Nollans' neighbors would ultimately request permits, and then would be required to give up their seaward property,
thus creating, in time, one long thin beach park. See 483 U.S. at 829; telephone conference with Nollans' attorney Robert K. Best, Pacific Legal Foundation (April 6, 1987).
146. By the time the case reached the United States Supreme Court the Nollans
managed to build the house during a "window of opportunity" between two different
state court appellate proceedings. 483 U.S. at 829. Because the challenge was to a specific application of a regulation it was an "as applied" rather than a "facial" attack.
147. Nollon, 483 U.S. at 831.
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would interfere so drastically with the Nollans' use of their property
as to constitute a taking.'"" In the situation where a permit can be
denied, and only in such a case, the agency also has the option to
approve the permit while imposing conditions on the permit when
for which
those conditions would directly ameliorate the same harms
149
the permit could have been denied in the first place.
Under Nollan, it might be acceptable for an agency to require a
builder to put in sewers in exchange for a permit to build a subdivision because without sewers, the development would be a health hazard. However, it would not be acceptable to require a builder to contribute to a fund to renovate city hall if the subdivision were not
likely to adversely affect city hall. In the case of the Nollans, the replacement of a bungalow with a new home was not the sort of activity
that was likely to create any need for a new lateral beach park. Therefore, the Commission could not condition this permit on the granting
of a beach strip.
The Commission tried to justify the action by saying that the new
home would obstruct the public's view of the beach. In the Commission's exact words, the home would prevent the public "psychologically .. .from realizing a stretch of coastline exists nearby they have
every right to visit. '' 15 The Court noted, however, that even if the
public's view of the beach were a legitimate governmental interest, a
lateral beach park did nothing at all to ameliorate the loss of the
view.' There was no nexus between the view and the exaction of
beachfront property." 2
Of special note is the Nollan Court's reliance on a heightened
scrutiny test for examining whether the conditions have the required
This has been internexus to the permitted development activity.'
preted by some to be a sign that the relegation of property rights to a
second class status of judicial protection and review, as hinted by the
infamous Carolene Product's Footnote 4,154 is over.'
148. Id. at 836.
149. Id.
150. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMM'N STAFF REP.,

Joint Appendix [to the briefs] Vol.

II at 58, NoUan, 483 U.S. 825 (1986). Some things can happen only in California.
151. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.
152. Id. at 838. Somewhat tongue in cheek, the Court noted that if the condition
were instead that the Nollans build a "viewing spot" for the public, then that might be
a different matter. Id. at 836.
153. "We have required that the regulation 'substantially advance' the 'legitimate
state interest' sought to be achieved . . . not that 'the State "could rationally have
decided" that the measure adopted might achieve the State's objective.' " Nollan, 483
U.S. at 834 n.3.
154. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
155. See, e.g., Karlin, supra note 87, at 629-31, 670-71. But see Frank Michelman,
Takings: 1987, 88 COLIJM. L. REV. 1600, 1608 (1988) ("[Tlhere may, however, be less to
Nollan's heightened scrutiny lesson than first appears."). See also Department of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc., 542 N.E.2d 1000 (Ind. 1989) (In the con-

text of mining, the Indiana Supreme Court found no taking when the state banned
strip mining in a historically significant area. This analysis is interesting in that it
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If heightened scrutiny is indeed a proper interpretation of NolIan, then the case might indicate a future where there will be less
judicial deference to acts of the police power that would otherwise be
considered a "taking" of private property rights. However, it should
be remembered that Nollan was decided by only a five vote majority.
Furthermore, this was the same Court that upheld the Bituminous
Act in Keystone.
To summarize, the key to Nollan is its "nexus" test: There must
be a "nexus" or "close 'fit' " between the supposed harms from the
166
Any practitioner
development and the condition to be imposed.
confronted by a request from the Corps of Engineers for wetlands
mitigation should carefully examine Nollan, and then determine (1)
whether the proposed development will actually cause the sort of
harm that would justify a denial of the permit in the first place (not15 7
ing that the denial cannot "interfere so drasticically"' with the use
of the property to constitute a taking), and (2) whether the proposed
condition will directly ameliorate that harm. Thus, being required to
replace one acre of wetlands in a floodplain near Seattle with ten acres
in the Amazon rain forest would probably fail, whereas a requirement
8
to restore one adjacent acre may have a greater chance of survival."
fund
a
mitigation
into
acre
per
$1,950
Similarly, a requirement to pay
for the Stephens' Kangaroo Rat"5 could only pass the nexus test if
the money is used to ameliorate a harm to the rat caused by developing the acre in question. 6 °
IV.

THE STANDARD TESTS FOR REGULATORY TAKINGS-PREDICTING
THE UNPREDICTABLE

Ultimately, all the theories and philosophical debate over takings
would be meaningless if there were not some tests which the practitioner can apply to a particular governmental action. Over time, the
courts have devised a set of tests to help determine whether a regulation violates the Constitution thus requiring invalidation and/or just
compensation. Unfortunately, while the tests are well-known, their
application is anything but certain. To maintain a sense of perspective, it is useful to remember that all the various takings tests and
subtests serve one purpose: the determination of when a governmental
action fails the fundamental underlying principle of the Takings
Clause-whether a regulation is "forcing some people alone to bear
attempts to limit Nollan's heightened scrutiny test.); Commercial Builders of Northern California v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejects NolIan's heightened scrutiny analysis).
156. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837-38.
157. Id. at 835-36.
158. See MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, supra note 4.

159. See supra note 76.
160. For a discussion of the law of conditions, see Michael H. Crew, Development
Agreements After Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 22 THE URB. LAW. 23
(1990).
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public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole."''
A.

The Agins Threshold Test

The most commonly articulated and accepted test for determining whether or not a governmental action has reached the threshold
for regulatory taking is Justice Powell's two prong test in Agins v.
City of Tiburon: "The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially
advance legitimate state82
' interests . . . or denies an owner economically
viable use of his land." '

1. The "Substantially Advance a Legitimate State Interest"
Prong
Whether or not a governmental action affecting property rights
"substantially advances a legitimate state interest" is not a particularly hard test to pass. First, there are few spheres of human activity
that are not today considered "legitimate" governmental interests.' 3
So long as the activity fits within the realm of the police power and
protects or promotes public health, safety, or welfare it is considered
4
by most courts to be a "legitimate" governmental interest.'
It has been rare for a court to find that a regulation does not
"substantially advance" a legitimate governmental interest. In Loveladies I the claims court stated that no governmental action ever failed
this test. ' However, the court had been briefed on, and was therefore
certainly aware of the Nollan case, one of the most dramatic examples
of a court striking down a government action because it did not substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest.' 6
161. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). See also supra text accompanying note 3.
162. 447 U.S. at 260 (emphasis added; citation omitted). Accord Nollan, 483 U.S.
at 834. See also Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
127 (1978).
163. See Loveladies I, 15 Cl. Ct. 390 (1988).
164. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-86
(1987). While there is some spirited debate in support of a more libertarian approach
to government, see, e.g., Epstein, Takings Descent, supra note 87, such theories have
not swayed the courts (yet) to overturn well-established precedent that defines very
broad parameters of the police power. As such, the theories calling for a return to a
more limited government are more of an academic than practical interest.
165. Loveladies 1, 15 Cl. Ct. at 390 (1988). Actually, the court may have been
referring only to the fact that no money damages have been awarded when a taking
has resulted from government's failure to meet the legitimate state interest prong. Id.
166. 483 U.S. at 834. Note that the "substantially advance" test is not passed just
because a public benefit such as a beach park is created. Instead, the requirement that
a property owner create such a public benefit must be related to the harm created by
the property owner's project. The Alaska Supreme Court missed this point when it
upheld a regulation which forced oil companies to give up well log data. The court
found that the "substantially advance" test was met because the data was useful to
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Another classic example of the Court striking down a regulation
because it failed to meet the "substantially advance" standard was in
Delaware, Lackawana, & Western Ry. Co. v. Morristown,'67 where the
taking of railroad property for a taxi stand failed to advance a legitimate governmental interest. Thus, while cases finding that a regulation does not meet the "substantially advance" test have been rare,
they do exist. It may be more common, however, for courts to consider
the "substantially advance" prong not as an absolute all or nothing
proposition, but as a question of degree.
For example, in Florida Rock I,168 the Federal Circuit Court reasoned that a "balancing" of public and private interests is relevant to
the "substantially advance" prong. 169 FloridaRock I involved a denial
by the Army Corps of Engineers of Section 404 permits required to
mine limestone. The court found that the Corps was not preventing a
public harm, but instead was maintaining a public benefit in aesthetics.' " The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals went on to say that such a
taking must be compensated, but remanded the case for a determination of the value of the property that was actually taken.' 7 '
In Loveladies I, on the other hand, the claims court did not use
the "substantially advance" threshold test either in whole or as part
of a balancing test. In deciding whether the Corps' prohibition on
placing fill for a housing development on Long Beach Island, New
Jersey, was a taking the court quoted Florida Rock I, but then said
the "substantially advance" test was "generally not a useful guideline. ' 172 Thus, the utility of the "substantially advance" test is not yet
"maximize the income from state land." Alaska v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., Nos. S3400, S-3416, S-3437, S-3776, 1991 WL 244366, at *10 (Alaska Nov. 22, 1991).
Justice Brennan's Nollan dissent, however, disregards the failure of the Coastal
Commission action to advance a legitimate governmental interest by noting that all
that would happen because of Nollan is that governmental agencies would become
more clever at conjuring up nexuses between governmental interests, regulations, and
conditions. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 863 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
167. 276 U.S. 182, 195 (1928) ("the declaration of the ordinance that the specified
part of the driveway 'is hereby designated

. . .

as [a) . . . hack stand' clearly transcends

the power of regulation" and would be a taking). Another case where a statute did not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest is Seawall Assoc. v. City of New York,
542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y. 1989) (vacancy decontrol). The court's articulation of the standard is particularly lucid.
168. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States (Florida Rock I), 791 F.2d 893
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
169. Id. at 904 (discussing a "substantial relationship to the public welfare,")
quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 261. Florida Rock I did not involve a case where the substantially advance prong was totally failed, because the court presumed that if the
application of the wetlands regulation was invalid, it should have been challenged as a
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988), in a different
court. 791 F.2d at 898.
170. "This appears to be a situation where the balancing of public and private
interests reveals a private interest much more deserving of compensation for any loss
actually incurred." Florida Rock 1, 791 F.2d at 904.
171. See infra Part IV(A)(2)(a) for discussion of valuation.
172. Loveladies 1, 15 Cl. Ct. at 389. Loveladies I went on to deny summary judgment motions leading to a trial to determine whether the "economically viable use"
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clear in the Claims Court. In any event, the total destruction of the
property value in both cases may have been the root cause of the finding of a takings in both cases. Perhaps on remand the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals will clarify this inconsistency.
In an unusual twist, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove,' held that a zoning regulation
was invalid because it did not advance a legitimate governmental interest." 4 The court continued to find, however, that there was no taking because there was no "public use" involved in the zoning of the
property.'' The court found no taking presumably because the Fifth
Amendment refers only to the taking of property "for public use."' 76
The property owners in Wheeler nevertheless prevailed, because the
court continued to hold that the invalid regulation denied the property owner's due process rights, thus giving rise to a civil rights claim
for damages under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act."'
In sum, the first threshold prong of Agins states that if a regulation fails to advance a legitimate governmental interest, there will be
a taking. This may not be an all or nothing proposition, however, because some courts have shown a willingness to "balance" consideration of state interests with economic impact.'7 " It is, therefore, crucial
to understand what sort of economic impacts the courts have
considered.
2.

The "Economically Viable Use of Property" Prong

The second part of the Agins test is the most difficult to apply.
Numerous cases have held that there is no " 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by government, rather than
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons."' 79 Instead,
the resolution of the issue depends largely upon the particular circumstances; courts have "examined the 'taking' question by engaging in
essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."' 8 These formulations do not

prong had been violated. This led to the eventual finding of a taking in Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States (Loveladies 11), 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990).
173. 664 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1981) (Wheeler I); 746 F.2d 1437 (llth Cir. 1984)
(Wheeler H); 833 F.2d 267 (11th Cir. 1987) (Wheeler Ill).
174. Wheeler 1, 664 F.2d at 100; Wheeler III, 833 F.2d at 270 n.3.
175. Wheeler II!, 833 F.2d at 270 n.3.
176. This reasoning does not follow any Supreme Court precedent. In Pennsylvania Coal, for example, the coal was not being taken for "public use," but only private
uses. This distinction was explained in Keystone, 480 U.S. at 484-85. The Wheeler
reasoning, does, however, follow Professor Settle's argument in Regulatory Taking
Doctrine. Settle, supra note 95, at 391. See also infra note 282.
177. Wheeler III, 833 F.2d at 270 n.3; The Civil Rights Act is found at 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1988). See infra Part X.
178. See, e.g., Florida Rock I, 791 F.2d at 904.
179. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
180. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
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provide the sort of useful bright line tests practitioners find helpful.
But they do plainly show that a good factual record is a predicate for
proving or disproving that a regulation's economic impact on private
property is a taking under the Agins "economically viable use"
threshold.
The most useful definition of "economically viable use" was formulated in Kaiser Aetna v. United States.""' There, the Court noted
that "the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action . . have particular significance."' 8 2 The interplay of
these three factors will determine whether a regulation has violated
the "economically viable use" test of Agins.
a. The Economic Impact of the Regulation. Some economic impact of a regulation, alone, is not enough for there to be a regulatory.
taking. As the United States Supreme Court has said, "[g]overnment
hardly could go on if to some extent, values incident to property could
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law."183

Indeed, there have been cases, such as Andrus v. Allard, where a
substantial diminution of value led to no taking."" In Florida Rock 1,
after addressing the balance between the purpose of the regulation
and the harm to the property, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
discussed how much property had actually been taken by comparing
the fair market value before and after the regulation was imposed.' 85
The court concluded that it was theoretically possible that some economically viable use remained for the wetlands despite the fact that
permits for limestone mining, the only known economically viable use,
had been denied. The court reasoned that speculators might buy the
property in the hope that the mining ban might someday be lifted."' 6
The case was remanded to determine whether such investors did in
8 7
fact exist."
If they did, then the property would still have value, and
the economic impact of the mining ban might not be so significant as
to result in a taking. 188
181. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175; quoted in Connolly v. Pension Benefits Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224-25 (1986). See also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
182. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175.
183. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413; see also Williamson County Regional

Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 198-99 (1985);
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979).
184. 444 U.S. at 66-68. Andrus involved the prohibition of the sale of eagle
parts-since owners of eagle parts could still display the parts in a museum, no taking
was found. But see Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (discussed infra note 253).
185. Florida Rock 1, 791 F.2d at 904-05.
186. Id. at 902 (noting that south Florida is a land "where the gullible are fleeced
...[and] where far-seeing investors realize fortunes").
187. Florida Rock I, 791 F.2d at 905.

188. Id; see, e.g., Beure'-Co. v. United States, 16 CI. Ct. 42 (1988), and Formanek
v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 785 (1989) (where the property owners overcame dismissal
motions when the court could not conclude that viable uses of property were left after
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On remand the Claims Court dismissed the notion that the property had any significant value based on "dreams of avarice" ' 9 and
held that the property lacked a "real market with knowledgeable investors."' 90 In short, the court rejected the notion that the value of
the property to the proverbial sucker looking for "swampland in Florida" was relevant. 19' Similarly, in Pennsylvania Coal, the Supreme
Court found a taking because the Kohler Act made coal mining "commercially impractical."'9
To summarize, one of the most accurate methods of determining
the economic impact of a regulation is to compare its fair market
value before and after the regulation. Where there has been a total
diminution in value, courts have found a taking.
b. Distinct Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations. The
"economic impact" factor of Kaiser Aetna may be useful, but it cannot be characterized as self-evident in meaning. A more focused way
of looking to see whether the "economically viable use" prong of
Agins has been violated is to consider the second factor of the Kaiser
Aetna test, reasonable investment-backed expectations. As with most
tests, this one raises about as many questions as it solves. When is an
investment expectation "reasonable" (which courts approve of) versus
unrealistic or a windfall and/or profiteering (which courts disapprove
93
of)? 1

An express government guarantee that property could be used for
a particular purpose has been held to be reasonable," as have reasonpermits to fill wetlands had been denied). The Formanek court also found that an
offer of purchase from the Nature Conservancy was insufficient as a matter of law in
refuting a taking presumably because the economic return from using the lands as a
nature preserve was unlikely to equal its value for development, Formanek, 18 Cl. Ct.
at 797.
189. Florida Rock II, 21 Cl. Ct. at 172.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 172-73, 175. (The Federal Circuit expressly referred to the relation between "suckers" and swampland in Florida, Florida Rock I, 791 F.2d. at 897). See also
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934) (no market for "mere speculation");
United States v. 117,763 Acres of Land in Imperial County, 410 F. Supp. 628 (S.D. Cal.
1976), aff'd sub nom.; United States v. Shewfelt Inv. Co., 570 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1977)
(no market consideration for the "sucker born every minute"). It should be noted that
the government's principal argument on appeal in FloridaRock II, is that "fair market
value" should ignore whether or not potential land investors are knowledgeable. Federal Government's Opening Brief, Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, Case No.
91-5156 (available from Pacific Legal Foundation on request).
192. 260 U.S. at 414. However, there was no economic analysis given to support
this statement. Id.
193. Compare Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States (Loveladies I), 21 Cl. Ct.
153 (1990) (wetland developer had reasonable expectation of developing last 12.5 acres
of wetlands) with Ciampitti v. United States (Campitti II), 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 318 (1991)
(no taking found when wetland owner had unreasonable expectation of finding a jurisdictional loophole to avoid regulation. The court appears to have been motivated, at
least in part, by an antipathy toward the owner's aggressive business tactics, allegedly
causing him to profit at the expense of his partners). Id. at 314-15.
194. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984) (an "explicit
government guarantee" to secure trade secret is a reasonable expectation); but see
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able expectations under existing regulatory programs."9 5 However,
courts have not found the hope of a continuing right to engage in activities that are deemed potentially dangerous to the national security,' 96 nor the hope of utilizing
a loophole in an existing regulatory
97
scheme to be reasonable.
If a property is already providing a fair return on investment, it
may be difficult to prove a reasonable investment-backed expectation
of greater profit. In Penn Central, the railroad argued that when the
city prohibited the company from adding additional stories above
Grand Central Station, its property had been taken.'
The Court,
however, disagreed, finding that the railroad company might have already recouped its investment-backed expectations with a "reasonable
return" from the original station. 9 In any event, the city's offer of
"transferable development rights" was seen to be adequate and just
compensation and, implicitly, a return on investment for any taking
that might have occurred."'
In the case of a wetland, the determination of what is a reasonable investment-backed expectation varies markedly by jurisdiction. In
some states the question could even be asked whether or not it is ever
reasonable for a property owner to expect to recoup an investment by
being allowed to develop a wetland. The answer was no in Just v.
Marinette County,20 1 a case decided before the modern era of Section
404 enforcement. The Wisconsin Supreme Court thought it would not
be reasonable to develop valuable wetlands. 02
Marinette County was cited with approval by the Washington
Supreme Court in Orion Corporation v. State: "Orion never had the
right to dredge and fill its tidelands ....
In that case, the Washington Supreme Court seemingly ignored the language of Nollan
which states that there is a right (rather than a privilege) to develop

Alaska v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., No. S-3400, Alaska Nov. 22, 1991 WL 244366
(1991) (no "investment backed" expectation to keep well log data secret).
195. United Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (compensation awarded when Department of Interior failed to approve uranium mine on
Navajo reservation after finding a reasonable expectation of approval).
196. Allied-General Nuclear Serv. v. United States, 839 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(no reasonable expectation in ability to operate a plutonium processing facility).
197. See Ciampitti II, 22 Cl. Ct. at 318.
198. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 107.
199. Id. at 129.
200. Id. at 136 n.33. In hindsight, Penn Central railroad should have offered proof
at trial that Grand Central Station did not provide a "reasonable return" and that the
transferable development rights were inadequate compensation. Instead, the railroad
agreed these rights were "valuable" but not just compensation. Id.
201. 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972). Accord M & I Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Town
of Somers, 414 N.W.2d 824 (Wis. 1987). See infra Part VIII (A).
202. 201 N.W.2d at 768. "An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to
change the essential natural character of his land . . . which injures the rights of
others." Id.
203. 747 P.2d 1062, 1073 (Wash. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988). See
also infra Part VIII(B).
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one's property.10 4 Also, there was a decidedly different conclusion
reached in both the Loveladies and Florida Rock series of cases. In
Florida Rock, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals found housing to
be a more valuable use than swampland20 1 while Loveladies expressly
rejected the Marinette County formulation as illogical.2"'
An interesting question arises in the context of the landowner
who bought wetlands a long time in the past-before any of the current focus on wetlands preservation came to the fore. Because some
courts consider inverse-condemnation rights to be personal, and not to
"run with the land," only the owner at the time the wetlands regulations are imposed can recover for takings damages."0 ' Under this theory, if the original owner sells the property, the original owner retains
the inverse-condemnation right unless the real estate contract expressly states otherwise."8 However, this notion may have been implicitly rejected in Nollan.'0 9
In short, the distinct investment-backed expectations test is difficult to apply. An attorney arguing this point would do well to proffer
ample evidence on what actually constitutes a reasonable investmentbacked expectation.
c. Character of the Governmental Action. The third factor mentioned in Kaiser Aetna is the "character of the government action."2 '
The courts that have considered this factor usually have done so in
the context of determining how the government action actually impacts the land. In Kaiser Aetna, for example, the government action
would have allowed public access onto what was formerly private
property.2 1 ' Indeed, this sort of "physical invasion" of private property is the "character" of government action most likely to give rise to
a taking.
In Penn Central the court noted that a "'taking' may more readily be found when [there is] ...

a physical invasion" rather than when

a regulation indirectly impacts on land such as "some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
public good. 2' 12 Indeed, physical invasion has often been seen as a
separate test unto itself, meaning that if the government's action
204. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2.
205. Florida Rock I, 791 F.2d at 904.
206. Loveladies 1, 15 Cl. Ct. at 388, 395.

207. 2

PHILLIP NICHOLS, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN,

§ 5.01[4] (1991).

208. See id.
209. See infra note 313.
210. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175.
211. Id. at 168.
212. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (citation omitted). Such public programs
would include police powers such as zoning. It should be noted that while a physical
invasion may take the property, it also may be a legitimate exercise of the police power
and may substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest. It is a taking, however, because of its impact on property. This, of course, recalls the Armstrong rationale
of disproportionate impact. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
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physically invades private property, there is a taking regardless of
whether any of the other tests have been met. s" 3
Some commentators have gone so far as to say that every case
where a taking has been found really just involved a physical inva5
sion.214 Examples cited include Kaiser Aetna,2 and the flooding cases
2
such as Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co. 16 One com217
almentator also characterizes Nollan as a physical invasion case,
though the Court's regulatory analysis of the law of permit conditions
does not seem to be dependent upon the character of the government
action. Despite the emphasis on physical invasions, however, it should
"a taking can occur by valid regulation with no
not be forgotten that
21 8
physical invasion.
B.

The So-Called "Nuisance" Exception to Takings

Throughout the discussions of takings law, there are references to
a "nuisance exception. ' 2 19 This exception is fervently advanced by environmentally oriented advocates of regulation of property 220 and just
as thoroughly dismissed by pro-property rights advocates and some
courts.22
213. See Robert Meltz, Federal Regulation of the Environment and the Taking
Issue, 37 FED. B. NEWS & J. 95-96; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 458
U.S. 419 (1982) (taking found for minimal intrusion by cable television wire; "the character of government action [in a physical occupation case] not only is an important
factor . .. [it] also is determinative." Id. at 426.)
214. See Michelman, supra note 155; Settle, supra note 95 at 387-88.
215. 444 U.S. at 179-80 (denial of right to exclude others equivalent to physical
invasion because trespass on property has a great potential impact on owners' use and
enjoyment of property).
216. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872) (the first recorded instance of the Supreme
Court finding inverse condemnation in favor of a landowner). This case established the
principle that when water backs up from a government owned dam onto private property, the government must pay for the value of the land lost. Id.
217. Michelman, supra note 155, at 1611-12. This distinction was followed in
Alaska v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., No. S-3400, 1991 WL 244366, at *9 (Alaska
Nov. 22, 1991). But see Yee v. City of Escondido, 1992 WL 60434, *6 (expressly refers
to Nollan as a regulatory taking case).
218. Florida Rock I, 791 F.2d at 900 (citing Skaw v. United States, 740 F.2d 932
(Fed. Cir. 1984)); see Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (discusses interplay between regulatory and physical invasion takings; taking found from
physical invasion of pollution monitoring wells used to assess nearby toxic waste
dump. But court noted that existence of regulatory taking "remains an issue in the
case." 952 F.2d at 1375.). See also NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERI-

CAN PLANNING LAW § 5A.20, at 174 n.74, n.75 (1988) (contrasts justices who see close
similarity between regulatory takings and physical invasions and those who do not).
219. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972). But see,
e.g., Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985); Florida Rock
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990).
220. See, e.g., Amicus Briefs of Environmental Defense Fund, Loveladies Harbor,
Inc. v. United States (Loveladies II), 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (No. 91-5050);
Florida Rock Indus., Inc, v. United States (Florida Rock II), 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (No. 91-5156) (available upon request from Pacific Legal Foundation).
221. See, e.g., Amicus Briefs of Pacific Legal Foundation, Whitney Benefits v.
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Conceptually, the nuisance exception could be viewed as an element of the "character" of government action. It also could be viewed
as an element in determining whether or not a regulation substantially advances the legitimate governmental interest prong of Agins.
The "nuisance exception" involves two basic questions. First,
does the regulation actually prevent some great public harm or nuisance? If it does, then it is a legitimate exercise of the police power.
Second, the question must be asked whether or not the regulation has
a significant economic impact. If the impact is too great there will be a
taking. The significance of there being a nuisance involved is that the
courts appear willing to tolerate a greater economic impact when nuisances are being regulated.
Proponents of the nuisance exception theory invariably hark back
to Mugler v. Kansas,22 where the Court found that it was permissible
for Kansas, a "dry" state, to shut down a brewery without giving rise
to a compensable taking. Mugler was decided before modern regulatory takings analysis. After Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,2" 3 Mugler's
vitality was problematic because Pennsylvania Coal had refuted the
notion that there could never be a taking from an exercise of the police power.224 Furthermore, if coal mining under buildings did not
have public nuisance implications, what would? Thus, the implication
from Mugler that police power regulations could not "take" property
was called into question by Pennsylvania Coal where a police power
regulation was found to be a taking.
Keystone Bituminous added more fuel to the debate after the
Court ruled that a statute very similar to the one in Pennsylvania
Coal was a valid exercise of the police power and was not a taking.
One court even said the so-called nuisance exception was "dusted off
. . . and put . . . back on its pedestal, while reducing Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon as a precedent pretty much [limited] to its own
peculiar facts."225 This is debatable. Keystone did not expressly overrule Pennsylvania Coal, and in light of First Church and Nollan, it is
apparent that there will still be regulations designed to limit nuisances or other public harms that "go too far" and constitute a taking.
In Nollan, for example, it was held that a permit denial that "would
interfere so drastically with the Nollans' use of their property . . .
[would] constitute a taking." ' 6 Indeed, this term the Supreme Court
in Lucas may confront head on the question of whether a public

United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991); Whitney Benefits,
926 F.2d at 1177 n.10.
222. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
223. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
224. See, e.g., Florida Rock 1, 8 Cl. Ct. at 170-71; see also Groen, supra note 111.
225. Allied General Nuclear Serv. v. United States, 839 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
226. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836.
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safety regulation which totally destroys the value of private property
is a taking.227
The real import of both Mugler and Keystone is that they are
both cases where the Court decided that the regulation at issue substantially advanced a legitimate governmental interest in public safety
(by abating a nuisance or preventing a public harm)-which is now
the first prong of the Agins test. Most significantly, Mugler arose in
an era when regulatory takings were not recognized to exist; it was not
until Pennsylvania Coal that the Court conceded that a taking could
occur through mere regulation. Keystone's citation of Mugler therefore simply helps buttress its analysis of the first prong of Agins.228
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals recently tried to put
Mugler and its progeny in perspective. In Whitney Benefits it explored the relationship between the early Mugler era cases and modern "nuisance" type cases. The court found that no "deference"
should be given to the government in takings cases merely because the
government asserts an exercise of the police power.2"' "The government's talismanic cry for reversal because 'public purpose' requires
constitutional
'deference' is simply a too-facile misapplication of the
230
parameters of takings law to the facts in this case.
Despite the reluctance of the federal courts to find a nuisance exception to takings, the exception lives in the swamps of some states.
In Washington, the state supreme court took the nuisance exception
to its outer limits in Orion,2 3 ' holding "[n]o compensable taking can
occur as long as regulations substantially serve the legitimate public
purpose of prohibiting uses of property injurious to the public interest
or the fiscal integrity of the [state]" (emin health, the environment,
23 2
phasis in original).
227. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991), cert.
granted, 112 S.Ct. 436 (1991).
228. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 490. Keystone then continued to find that the second
part of the Agins formulation had not been met because in the facial challenge at issue
there was no proof of loss of economic value. Id. at 493-501. Mugler never reached this
stage of analysis because it was decided in an era before it was recognized that the loss
of value of property through regulation could give rise to a taking. See Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1177 n.10; Groen, supra note 111.
229. Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1177, 1177 n.10. See also Keystone, 480 U.S.

at 512 (nuisance exception not coterminous with police power (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)); Florida Rock I, 8 Cl. Ct. at 170-71; FloridaRock II, 21 Cl. Ct. at 168. This issue
may be resolved after the Supreme Court decides Lucas.
230. Whitney Benefits, 926 F.2d at 1177.

231. Orion Corp. v. State of Washington, 747 P.2d 1062, 1081 (Wash. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988). See infra text accompanying notes 205-98.
232. 747 P.2d at 1081. Perfecting the art of understatement, the court continued,
"iclertain aspects of our state regulatory takings doctrine appear to conflict with federal analysis." Id. See also Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 787 P.2d 907 (Wash.
1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 284 (1990), which "clarifies" Orion. For two other cases
which adopt the nuisance exception to the detriment of property owners, see Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (1991), petition for cert. granted, 112
S. Ct. 436, __ U.S. - (Nov. 18, 1991); Beard v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
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This case is disturbing, because it appears to be saying that the
nuisance exception is as broad as the police power. In other words, a
legitimate exercise of the police power cannot give rise to a taking.
This notion, incidentally, was expressly rejected in Florida Rock II:
"All valid statutes and regulations exist for the public welfare. But
the assertion that a proposed activity would be a nuisance merely because Congress chose to restrict, regulate, or prohibit it for the public
benefit indicates circular233reasoning that would yield the destruction of
the Fifth Amendment.
Finally, even if the purpose of regulation is to abate a nuisance,
there will still be a taking if the regulation takes all the value of the
property. 2" As noted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in McDougal v. County of Imperial,2 35 the United States Supreme Court
has never held otherwise: "te]ven in those cases where the activity
restrained was akin to a public nuisance and the state's interest was
admittedly substantial, the Court has gone on to weigh the claimant's
showing of diminution of value to his property. 2 36 This point was illustrated well in Yancey v. United States,237 where takings damages
were awarded to a turkey farmer who had his turkeys quarantined
during an outbreak of Asian flu. The public benefit from the quarantine did not negate a finding of a taking.
Nonetheless, because the existence of a nuisance does and probably will continue to influence the courts, an attorney arguing a wetland or other environmental case should be prepared to deal with the
nuisance exception. It is critical, for example, to offer proof that a
particular wetland or species habitat in question is (or is not) ecologi-

403 S.E.2d 620 (1991), petition for cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 185 (1991).
233. Florida Rock II, 21 Cl. Ct. at 168. See also Florida Rock I, 8 Cl. Ct. at 170
(making a nuisance exception coterminous with the police power would read the Compensation Clause "out of existence").
234. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835-36 (permit can be denied "outright ... unless the
denial would interfere so drastically with the Nollans' use of their property as to constitute a taking"). Keystone, 480 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("our cases
have never applied the nuisance exception to allow complete extinction of the value of
a parcel of property").
235. 942 F.2d 668, 678 (1991).
236. Id. Thus, in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), plaintiffs did not contend, nor the Court conclude, that no structures at all could be built, or that there was
in any way a complete deprivation of all economically viable use of land. Id. In
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), the prohibition of a brickyard operation
did not prevent plaintiff from building residences or other manufacturing enterprises.
Id. In Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), Virginia's order to plaintiff to destroy
diseased cedar trees did not prevent owner from using those trees or from making any
other viable use of the property. (Furthermore, plaintiffs alleged only a due process
violation and not a taking.) Id. In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594
(1962) the plaintiff failed to produce evidence that a prohibition against a quarry
"even remotely suggests that prohibition of further mining will reduce the value of the
lot in question." Id. Finally, in Keystone, 480 U.S. at 492-93, the Court pointed out
that plaintiffs "failed to make a showing of diminution of value sufficient to satisfy the
test set forth in Pennsylvania Coal and our other regulatory takings cases." Id.
237. 915 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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cally valuable, and has (or does not have) a relationship to downstream flooding, pollution abatement, and the like.
V.

REMEDIES MUST BE EXHAUSTED FOR A CLAIM

To BE

RIPE

More takings cases have been lost or remanded for failure to exhaust than for any other cause.238 Courts are reluctant to decide cases
if other remedies are available. The most common way of avoiding a
takings claim is to argue that it is impossible to find a taking because
the court does not know what a governmental body ultimately would
or would not allow a property owner to do with a regulated property
until all avenues of relief have been exhausted.
The United States Supreme Court has been more than clear on
this requirement.2 39 This presents a troublesome difficulty for property owners because the pursuit of alternative permits, variances, zoning change requests, and so on can eat up an exorbitant amount of
capital. A landowner may easily run out of cash before being ready to
file a case for a taking.
A potential way to overcome a failure to exhaust argument is to
claim that it would be futile to exhaust administrative procedures.
Courts will not require litigants to jump through hoops when it can be
shown that no administrative relief is available.240 However, a corollary of the rule requiring exhaustion is that it is almost futile to argue
that it would be futile to try to exhaust remedies.2 4 Even when remedies are not available, litigants have been told to exhaust them. For
example, the Court's refusal to reach the merits in Agins or San Diego
has been seen by some to reflect a lack of understanding of the remedies available under California law. 42 However, some lower federal
4 3
courts have been more hospitable to futility exception arguments.'
238. See cases cited infra note 239. For a discussion of the doctrine of exhaustion
and its exceptions, see BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, §§ 8.30-8.31, at 50206 (2d ed. 1984).
239. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (appellants should have
submitted alternative development plans); San Diego Gas and Elect. Co. v. San Diego,
450 U.S. 621 (1981) (no final decision below on taking issue); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (developer should have applied for variance and sought compensation through established
state procedures); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assoc., 452 U.S.
264 (1981) (coal miners did not prove effects, if any, from regulation); MacDonald,
Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (developer must explore alternate building plans).
240. See United States v. Anthony Grace & Sons, 384 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1966).
241. See Presbytery of Seattle, 787 P.2d at 916.
242. See, e.g., Bauman, supra note 135.
243. For example, in Florida Rock II, the court found that once a Section 404
permit is denied, there is no reason to apply for state permits. Florida Rock IH, 21 Cl.
Ct. at 170. "With respect to the state permit applications, there is no legal requirement
for a party to expend time and money on what would clearly be an unnecessary and
futile exercise . .. [because] 'lilt would serve no purpose to require claimant to exhaust administrative procedures before seeking judicial review when it is clear that
resort to administrative action would be futile.' " Id. (quoting Conant v. United States,
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There is currently no precedent explaining how much exhaustion
is required in an Endangered Species Act takings claim. If, for example, a property owner cannot obtain a federal permit to utilize land
because of the presence of a spotted owl or desert tortoise, must the
property owner first ask the permitting agency to ask the Secretary of
Interior to prepare a biological opinion and issue an incidental takings
statement? 2" If activity on private property threatens to take or harass an endangered species must the property owner propose a habitat
conservation plan245 with attendant mitigation measures? Finally, if
the preceding options fail, must the property owner request the invocation of the cabinet level "God Squad ' 248 for relief?
Quite obviously, if any of these procedures are theoretically available, and not utterly futile, they should be pursued. If they are not
be spent arguing that the
pursued, considerable time and energy will
2 7
available remedies were not meaningful. 1
VI.

THE SIZE OF THE PARCEL-WHAT OF PARTIAL TAKINGS?

If a property owner owns a parcel with 1,000 upland acres and
one acre of wetland on which activity is absolutely prohibited, is there
a taking? What if the one acre of wetland is all that a property owner
owns? Generally speaking, a court will not break up property holdings
for the sake of a takings analysis. Thus while the owner of only one
acre of wetland might very well have had the property taken, the
owner of the 1,001 acres might not because a court might reason, for
expectations have not been signifiexample, that investment-backed
2 48
cantly reduced.
Logically, however, there is a flaw in this reasoning. If the taking
were for a highway, rather than wetland, compensation would be due
whether the owner owned one, ten, or a million acres.249 An owner
unable to use an acre of wetland, however, can be just as much at an
12 Cl. Ct. 689, 692 (1987)). Accord Loveladies 1,15 Cl. Ct. at 386 (plaintiffs should not
be forced to resort to "some endless series of requirements"). See also Sierra Lake
Reserve v. City of Rocklin, 938 F.2d 951, 954-55 (9th Cir. 1991) (no need to pursue
futile California court remedies in mobile home rent control takings case); Azul Pacifico v. City of Los Angeles, 948 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1991); Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz,
830 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1987) (futility discussed); Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870
F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1989) (discusses exhaustion); Theodore E. Worcester, Land Use
Planning and Regulation After Granite Rock: State and Local Control of Operations
on Federal Lands, 36 RocKy MTN. MIN. L. INST., § 19.05, at 19-27 to 19-38 (1990).
244. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (1988). See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
245. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(1) (1988). See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
246. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)-(h) (1988). See supro notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
247. Finally, it is a rare case indeed when a court is reversed after dismissing a
case on exhaustion grounds. For such a case, see Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Auth., 938 F.2d. 153 (9th Cir. 1991) (attempt to amend general plan not necessary for claim to be ripe).
248. See supra text accompanying note 198.
249. See generally, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982) (taking when television cable attached to building).
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economic disadvantage with respect to that acre as an owner of land
taken for a highway. From the landowner's perspective, it does not
make any difference that a highway is a physical invasion and the
wetland regulation is not a per se physical invasion-the land cannot
be used and creates no wealth. 5 As Justice Brennan said in dissent:
Police power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other
land-use restrictions can destroy the use and enjoyment of property in order to promote the public good just as effectively as formal condemnation or physical invasion of property. From the
property owner's point of view, it may matter little whether his
land is condemned or flooded, or whether it is restricted by regulation to use in its natural state, if the effect in both cases is to
deprive him of all beneficial use of it.25
The United States Supreme Court has been split on whether or
not there is a taking when just one of the "bundle of sticks" of property ownership has been destroyed. For example, in Andrus v. Allard, 52 the Court held that the denial of just one of the sticks in the
bundle of property rights, the "transferability stick," or the right to
sell eagle parts, was not enough for there to be a taking. But in Hodel
v. Irving 53 the Court overturned a law that prohibited intestate and
testamentary succession for small Indian allotments.25 The Court
found that the statute "took" the "testamentary stick," or the right to
have one's property go to one's heirs through the law of intestate
succession. 55
In Penn Central,256 the loss of another stick in the bundle, the
full use of air rights alone, did not constitute a taking because other
rights in the property remained.1 7 On the other hand, where property
rights are easily divisible, and commonly held by different owners,
such as with mineral and surface rights, a regulation of only part of
the total property might constitute a taking because a single property

250. An exception might exist for the theoretical case where a non-development
use (e.g. hunting, bird watching) is more valuable than a development use. Such was
not the case in Loveladies II, 21 Cl. Ct. at 158-59.
251. San Diego, 450 U.S. at 652 (footnote omitted), quoted with approval by
Judge Kozinski in FloridaRock 1, 8 Cl. Ct. at 170, 171 n.1l.
252. 444 U.S. 51 (1967).
253. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
254. Id. During the "assimilation" era of Indian policy, tribal property was subdivided and allotted to tribal members. Now, after several generations, some allotments
are held by many dozens of owners, making it a practical impossibility to put the land
to economic use-perpetuating the cycle of poverty. See Irving, 481 U.S. at 706-09;
FREDERICK COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 137-38 (1982). The law at issue
in Irving was an attempt to consolidate the land ownership by transferring devised
and intestate shares to the tribes-at the direct expense of the heirs. 481 U.S. at 709.
255. 481 U.S. at 717.
256. Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
257. Id. at 129. The court also noted that Penn Central had not refuted the argument that "transferable development rights" were not just compensation. Id.
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owner may lose everything, even though the interests of other owners
of the property may be unaffected by the regulation. Pennsylvania
Coal recognized this possibility, and a taking of the mineral and support estates was found, even though the surface estate remained unaffected." 8 In Whitney Benefits25 9 this concept was applied when the
circuit court upheld a $60 million damage award for the taking of the
mineral estate, although the surface estate remained largely intact
(and largely under separate ownership). 6 °
A unique "partial takings" issue was decided in Florida Rock I,
where the landowner originally argued that all 1,560 acres of its wetland mining property had been taken after a permit to mine on only
98 acres was denied. 26 ' The government argued, on the other hand,
that there was no taking because the use of only 98 acres had been
denied, leaving the "parcel as a whole" largely unaffected by the denial.2"2 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals rejected both arguments,
holding that (1) it would be unfair to award compensation for property for which the applicant had no immediate plans,26 3 and (2) the
idea that there was some value to the remaining 1,458 acres (which
would give meaning to the "parcel as a whole" value argument) was
totally unrealistic under the circumstances. 6 ' Thus, to prevail in a
takings claim when a permit to develop only part of a parcel has been
denied, it would be helpful to offer evidence that the rest of the property has been rendered worthless as well.
Finally, in Loveladies I and 1/, the claims court awarded compensation when 12.5 acres of property was rendered useless after a wetland permit was denied, although the parcel was originally 250 acres
in size. 5 On appeal in Loveladies II, the federal government is arguing that the court must consider the entire original parcel before de-

258. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 (treats transfer of the support estate as
the transfer of a compensable property right).
259. Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
260. Id. In Washington, the supreme court briefly adopted the idea that property
could be subdivided for a takings analysis in Allingham v. Seattle, 749 P.2d. 160
(1988). See Settle, supra note 95, at 396-400, for criticism of Allingham. This holding
was overruled in Presbytery of Seattle, 787 P.2d at 915.
261. Florida Rock I, 791 F.2d at 895-06, 904-05. Had the permit been granted,
ninety-eight acres was all that could have been mined in three years, the term of the
permit. Id.
262. Id. at 904.
263. Id. at 904-05.
264. Id. at 904.
265. Loveladies I, 15 Cl. Ct. at 391-93; Loveladies 11, 21 Cl. Ct. at 160, 161 n.9.
This holding can be reconciled with CiampittiII, 22 Cl. Ct. at 320 (1991), where neighboring upland parcels were considered to be a part of the parcel as a whole. In the
Loveladies cases, the parcels had been sold off a long time ago, while Mr. Ciampitti
still owned some of the upland parcels in question. 22 Cl. Ct. at 320 (noting the parcels
were "still owned" as of the date of the lawsuit). See also Deltona Corporation v.
United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1192-93 (1981) (Deltona Corp. had been given a permit
to fill some property; decision does not state whether Deltona owned this property at
the time of subsequent denials; the court did note that portions of land not permitted
also retained substantial value).
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ciding whether a taking has occurred. 26 Based on the profit earned
over the past 30 years, according to the government, there has been no
significant destruction of investment-backed expectations.26 7 The
United States Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed the issue
of partial takings." 8
VII.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES

Once it has been determined that a taking has occurred, the
courts will next determine the value of the property taken. This will
generally be based upon the fair market value of the property at the
time of the taking." 9 Fair market value cannot be augmented by unreasonable speculation, 27° nor diminished by considering the deleterious effects on land value caused by the regulation that caused the taking. 27' In Florida Rock I, for example, the government had argued
that if the regulation reduced the value of the property to zero, then
there would be no Fifth Amendment liability. The court surmised
that appellant "added this contention to
provide a little humor for an
272
otherwise serious and scholarly brief.
In the case where a regulation takes property only for a limited
period of time, such as when a regulation is amended, there may still
be a temporary taking. 272 Most federal cases to consider the measure
of damages
for "temporary takings" have involved denials of mining
2 74
permits.
VIII. A

SURVEY OF SELECTED STATE REACTIONS TO THE COLLISION

BETWEEN THE PROTECTION OF WETLANDS AND THE TAKINGS DOCTRINE

Not all environmental regulations are federal. When property is
taken by state regulation, then a property owner may attempt to file a
takings claim in state court, alleging violations of both state and fed266. See Brief of Government, Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct.
153 (1990) (No. 91-5050).
267. Id.
268. For a California state court case where a court found it could look at a 1.7acre plot of an 8.5-acre parcel separately for partial takings analysis, see Twain Harte
Assocs., Ltd. v. County of Toulumne, 265 Cal. Rptr. 737 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
269. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934). For extensive discussions of valuation, see Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990); Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1991); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United
States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394 (1989), afl'd, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 406 (1991).
270. Olson, 292 U.S. at 257.
271. Florida Rock I, 791 F.2d at 905.
272. Id.
273. See supra Part III(B)(2).
274. See Yuba Natural Resources, Inc. v. United States (Yuba 1), 821 F.2d 638
(Fed. Cir. 1987); Yuba Natural Resources, Inc. v. United States, 904 F.2d 1577 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (updating Yuba 1). For a useful discussion of temporary regulatory takings,
see Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (analogizing length of
time vehicle parked on property to significance of temporary taking).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol27/iss2/4

42

Burling: Property Rights, Endangered Species, Wetlands, and Other Critters
1992

REGULATORY TAKINGS

eral constitutional rights, plus perhaps a violation of Section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act. 7 " Theoretically, state courts can provide greater
protection under state constitutions than provided by federal constitutional law. Some state constitutions, for example, protect against
both a "taking" of, and "damage" to, property.276
However, a number of state courts are seemingly trying to steadfastly ignore the law of the 1987 takings cases by carving out a special
wetlands exception to property rights. Under this theory, persons who
buy wetlands are entitled to less protection than those who own uplands. This section summarizes some of the more recent and significant state cases.
A. The "When You Buy a Swamp You Just Get a Swamp" Theory
of Takings- Wisconsin Cases
The "if you buy a swamp, you just get a swamp" trend started in
Wisconsin in Just v. Marinette County.27 7 As stated by the court: "An
owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for
which it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights
of others."2
It is highly debatable, however, whether the development of a wetland usually "injures the rights of others," but this appears to be assumed by the court.27 It is also debatable whether the
general pronouncement against altering the natural character of land
survives footnote 2 of Nollan which states that the ability to develop
property is a right and not a government benefit.""0 Be that as it may,
the Marinette County result was followed in M & I Marshall & Ilsley
Bank v. Town of Somers, 81 and Reel Enterprises v. City of La
Crosse2 s2

275. Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). See discussion infra Part
X. It is beyond the scope of this article to examine the choice of law questions involved. Note, however, that Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), requires compensation to be sought
first through state procedures. Sierra Lake Reserve v. City of Rocklin, 938 F.2d 951
(9th Cir. 1991), explains that the federal courts may still be available if state remedies
are futile.
276. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 18; WASH. CONST art. I, § 16; Wyo. CONST.
art. I, § 33. But see, Presbytery of Seattle, 787 P.2d at 911 n.10 (finding no significance
to the word "damage"); but see DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 439
n.3 (Alaska 1987) (term "'damages' affords the property owner broader protection").
277. 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
278. Id. at 768.
279. This was not found to be the case, for example, in Loveladies 1, 15 Cl. Ct. at
395 (rejecting Marinette County). See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
Property owners trying to challenge the Marinette County argument that filling
wetlands is an inherently harmful activity may be wise to spend the time and money
to prove otherwise with respect to their particular parcels.
280. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2.
281. 414 N.W.2d 824 (Wis. 1987).
282. 431 N.W.2d 743 (Wis. App. 1988). The Reel court found no taking for a denial of a fill permit, but continued to find that a denial of a sewer extension was unlaw-
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The Somers court also found a distinction between regulations
designed to create a public benefit (compensable) versus regulations
that take property to prevent public harms (noncompensable)."8 3
Note, however, that Somers continues by softening this position,
somewhat, by finding that a regulation designed to avoid a public
harm may be compensable nonetheless if it "results in a value diminution . . . so great as to amount to a confiscation.""" 4
In short, under Wisconsin state law, no taking will be found if a
property owner is denied the right to change a wetland to an upland,
especially if the regulation is designed to prevent a harm, rather than
create a benefit. Property owners, therefore, would be wise to find a
way to the federal courthouse and argue for federal precedent.
B. The State of Washington Goes Its Own Way and Ignores First
Church for Property Owners Who "Bought the Swamp"
With Orion, 85 the Washington Supreme Court cited and followed
the Marinette County rationale: "Orion never had the right to dredge
'
Presbytery87 clarified the Orion decision,
and fill its tidelands."286
ful. However, in a questionable rendering of First Church, the Reel court found that
there could be no temporary taking during the period the sewer permit was unlawfully
denied because the government had no authority to deny the permit. Id. at 830-31.
Recent cases reject the theory proscribing inverse condemnation claims against government entities which lack condemnation authority. In Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 174
n.8, the Court looked toward the substance rather than the form of the government
action: " '[c]onfiscation may result from a taking of the use of property without compensation quite as well as from the taking of the title'" (quoting Chicago, R.I. & P.
Ry. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80, 96 (1931)). Accord First Church, 482 U.S. at 315-16
(noting that Takings Clause is self-executing and depends on impact of government
action of property rather than formal exercise of condemnation authority). See also
Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866 (1985) (finding inverse condemnation possible against entity that lacks condemnation power); Fountain
v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038, 1043-44 (11th Cir. 1982) (same
holding as Baker); accord Orion, 747 P.2d at 1075, (cites Fountain with approval),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1986). See also State v. The Mill, 809 P.2d 434 (Colo.
1991) (finding a distinction between regulatory takings and inverse condemnation in
order to provide a remedy when the government lacks condemnation power).
But see Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 787 P.2d, 907 (Wash. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2284 (1990), where the court's finding of no compensation for substantive due process violations-those regulations that do not advance a legitimate
governmental interest-may be consistent with not awarding compensation against entities without compensation authority because there is no "public use" or "public purpose" in an invalid regulation. Also, Florida Rock I noted that a Tucker Act (takings
claim) lawsuit assumes the propriety of the state action, 791 F.2d at 899. See also
supra text accompanying notes 174-176.
283. 414 N.W.2d at 830. The "public harm" rationale may be logically related to
the "nuisance doctrine," see supra note 231 and accompanying text, although the
court did not specifically refer to nuisances. See also supra note 115 and accompanying text regarding the articulation of this theory by Professor Stoebuck. See also
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, supra note 88, at 1196-1201.
284. 414 N.W.2d at 831.
285. Orion Corp. v. State of Washington, 747 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988). See also Settle, supra note 95.
286. Orion, 747 P.2d at 1073.
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making it clear that the law in Washington is unique. The Presbytery
case involved 4.5 acres of land owned by the Presbytery of Seattle, a
church. Wetlands regulations made over half the property undevelopable. Although the plaintiff never applied for a permit,288
plaintiff sued and alleged that the county's ordinance, on its face, took
the Presbytery's property. While the case likely could have been simply dismissed for failure to exhaust, the court noted some confusion in
the pleadings about what constituted a taking and took upon itself the
task, in "a consideration of recent ... case law,"'2 89 to outline the law
of takings according to the Washington Supreme Court.
The most unusual and controversial part of the court's analysis in
Presbytery was the establishment of a threshold test for even reaching
a takings analysis. In short, the court ruled that if a regulation does
not either: (1) go beyond preventing harm to the point that it actually
enhances a publicly owned right in property, or (2) infringe upon any
of what are called "fundamental attributes of ownership," then a challenge can be brought only on substantive due process grounds. 8 " Significantly, the court's definition of "fundamental attributes" is exceedingly narrow, naming only the rights to possess, exclude, and
sell,28 ' and ignores the right to build and use property discussed in
Nollan.2" 2
Furthermore, if a challenge is confined to due process grounds,
the only remedy the Washington court allows "is invalidation of the
regulation. No compensation .. .is warranted."2"' Prohibiting compensation, "avoids intimidating the legislative body,"29 ' which is a rationale expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court in
First Church and in Justice Brennan's San Diego dissent.""'
From the perspective of property owners, the Presbytery decision
is disturbing; it could lead to the pre-First Church regime of abuse
where after spending thousands of dollars in carrying costs (e.g., mortgages) and attorneys fees, a landowner might get an ordinance overturned, only to face a nearly identical and equally obnoxious ordi-

287. Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 787 P.2d 907 (Wash. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990).
288. 787 P.2d at 917.
289. Id. at 911. The "consideration of recent .. .case law" is also known as dicta.
290. Id. at 912-14. The court also ruled that the exhaustion doctrine applies in
substantive due process challenges, a claim rejected by federal case law. See, e.g., Yee
v. City of Escondido, 1992 WL 60434, *8; Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass'n. v. City of Simi
Valley, 882 F,2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1989). See also Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857
F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1988).
291. 787 P.2d. at 912.
292. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2.
293. 787 P.2d at 913.
294. Id.
295. First Church, 482 U.S. at 317-19; San Diego, 450 U.S. at 660-61, 655 n.22
(example where intimidation was in order). See supra notes 131-132 and accompanying text.
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nance all over again. 2 6 Under the Presbytery holding, property
owners lose the ability to use land and government officials are not
held accountable for constitutional takings violations.
In the event that a takings analysis is warranted, the tests advanced by the Presbytery court are consistent with federal law, except
that federal law has never held that a regulatory action must always
deny all use of property for a taking to occur.297 Instead of Presbytery's "all use" rule, each case should be looked at on an ad hoc
basis.2" 8
C. In New Hampshire, Persons Who Were on Notice That They
Bought a Regulated Swamp Have No Reasonable Expectation of
Compensation
In several decisions2 99 the supreme court of New Hampshire has
opted to follow the Marinette County rule that there is no right to
change the essential character of a wetland."' In Claridge v. New
Hampshire Wetlands Board,30 ' the state Supreme Court upheld the
trial court's finding that filling a wetland to build a house and septic
system would do "irreparable damage to an already dangerously diminished and irreplaceable natural resource. ' ' Thus, this finding
represents an apparent trend for state courts to presume that all wetlands filling activities are inherently harmful. Such a trend
has not
03
been adopted by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.
The New Hampshire court's reference to an "already ... diminished . . .resource" is troubling. Does this mean it is acceptable for
property owners to develop a resource until it is depleted, or until air
pollution, noise, or traffic reaches a critical level? If so, those owners
who are first with the bulldozers would win. Once a resource is depleted would all owners of undeveloped property be prevented from
any development, and if so would these owners not bear a disproportionate share of the burden of protecting the depleted resource? And
would it not give savvy property owners an incentive to immediately
fill, develop, and build before their neighbors deplete the resource?
Perhaps a more equitable burden sharing system would require those
296. See supra notes 131 and 132 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 236.
298. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. In Keystone the Court noted that a facial
challenge was an "uphill battle" but did not indicate that all value of property must
be denied. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495. See, eg., Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168
(Me. 1989).
299. These decisions were joined, but not written by Justice Souter.
300. See supra Part VIII(A). The Marinette County rule was also followed in a
decision before Souter was on the state court. Sibson v. State, 336 A.2d 239, 243 (N.H.
1975).
301. 485 A.2d 287 (N.H. 1984).
302. Id. at 289.
303. Florida Rock II, 21 Cl. Ct. at 167; Loveladies 1, 15 Cl. Ct. at 390, 395; see
supra note 279 and accompanying text.
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owners who have already depleted their share of the resource to compensate, through the mechanism of inverse condemnation, those owners who chose to not immediately develop.
In turning to the issue of how much economic value remained in
the property, the Claridge court found that "the land continues to
have some economic value."30 4 However, it appears that the court's
real justification for finding a remaining economic value was that the
owner had "notice of statutory impediments to the right to develop."30 There was no taking because the plaintiff had "constructive
notice that the property was subject to state wetlands statutes," '
and that there was a "strong public policy against the filling of
saltmarshes."30 7 The court thought' 1the Claridges chose the risk in

light "of growing public concerns.

30

In accordance with Claridge, the rule in New Hampshire is that a
purchaser who is "on notice" of the regulations has no right to inverse-condemnation damages.2" Only the owner at the time the regulations are enacted has such rights. Of course, the original owner theoretically has the right to sell those rights to the purchaser, but this
should be clearly spelled out in the real estate contract. 0
Following the doctrine that there are no investment-backed ex-

304. 485 A.2d at 289. Although the values mentioned (sale to abutters or using a
neighbor's property for a leach field) appear to be fanciful, or as the concurrence (not
joined by Souter) noted "conjectural" and "of little solace." Id. at 292 (King, C.J.,
concurring).
305. Id. at 291.
306. Id. at 292.
307. Id.
308. Id. The Claridge "notice" rule was upheld in State Wetlands Bd. v. Marshall,
500 A.2d 685, 689-90 (N.H. 1985) (Souter was on majority panel). In 1989, the notice
rule was upheld in Rowe v. Town of North Hampton, 553 A.2d 1331, 1335-36 (N.H.
1989). In addition, the property owner in Rowe "failed to provide any evidence that
her plans for the lot would not harm the wetland," and her property "would still have
market value even if construction were not allowed." Id. at 1336.
It would be interesting to present an analogous case to the court, but one where
the property owner's family had owned the land for many years, perhaps generations,
before the promulgation of wetlands regulations. Would that owner be considered to
have substantial investment-backed expectations? Or would the mere privilege of owning the property, paying taxes on it, and watching its value appreciate with inflation be
enough?
309. The knowledge of the landowner at time of purchase was found to be relevant in Florida and Maine. See Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374,
1382 (Fla. 1981); Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n v. White, 521 A.2d 710 (Me.
1987).
Other states have considered this factor indirectly in the context of the doctrine of
"vested rights" whereby a developer who is far enough along in a permit process is
seen to have right to develop, regardless of subsequent changes in the law. There is no
doctrinal uniformity in the vested rights doctrine. See I NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR., &
JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN PLANNING LAW § 5A.15, at 166 (1988). However, in
Ciampetti (sic] v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 548 (1989), the claims court quoted that
knowledge of wetlands regulations is but one factor in the "constitutional balance." Id.
at 558.
310. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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pectations (at least for subsequent purchasers) after regulations are
passed, the New Hampshire court in Rowe v.North Hampton found
that the permit denial "did not prevent the plaintiff from maintaining
current uses of the property, but rather prevented a major change in
the wetland for speculative benefit." '' Whether this will evolve into
an "antispeculative-profit" rule is anybody's guess."1 2 In short, the
evolution of the notice rule in New Hampshire may have some implications for federal law,31 3 now that Justice Souter is on the United
States Supreme Court.
D. In Florida, There Is No Taking When a Property Owner Buys a
Wetland on Notice and Is Denied a Permit to Build
Where a property owner purchased land "with full knowledge
that part of it was totally unsuitable for development," there was no
taking. 314 Relying on Marinette County, the court found no right to
"change the essential natural character" of land. 3 5 Furthermore, the
court equated the filling with pollution, thus adopting a nuisance like
exception for wetlands filling."' In summary, the Florida Court has
taken a strong stand; it will not find a taking when a wetlands permit
is denied. Considering the outcome in the Claims Court in Florida
Rock and Loveladies, it may behoove property owners in Florida to
apply for a federal permit first and sue the federal government in federal court." 7

311. 553 A.2d at 1336 (emphasis added).
312. But compare Ciampetti [sic] v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 548, 558 (1989)
(Ciampitti I) (rejecting notice rule) with Ciampitti 1I, 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (holding no taking when property owner had unreasonable expectation to evade current regulations).
313. This "notice rule" appears to be implicit in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986, 1011 (1984). In his dissent in Nollan, Justice Brennan concluded that the
Nollans were "clearly on notice," that the Commission would condition a new development permit with a beach access permit and therefore had "no reasonable expectation" of maintaining their private beach. 483 U.S. at 858-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See also discussion in Daniel R. Mandelker, Waiving the Taking Clause: Conflicting
Signals from the Supreme Court, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG, Nov. 1988, at 3, 5.
As noted by Mandelker, however, Justice Scalia's majority opinion did not agree.
Id. (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2). Considering the New Hampshire court's embrace of the notice rule, the replacement of Justice Brennan by Justice Souter may
have little effect on the United States Supreme Court's scorecard on the issue.
314. Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1382 (Fla. 1981). By
"totally unsuitable," the court meant the land would be unsuitable for homes unless
filled.
315. Id.
316. Id. The Florida Courts of Appeal have followed the Graham "status quo"
test. See, e.g., Glisson v. Alachua County, 558 So. 2d 1030, 1034-35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990); Namon v. State, 558 So. 2d 504, 505 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1990) (a "subjective
expectation that the land could be developed" is not a vested property right).
317. In Loveladies II, the court found the lack of state permits was not an impediment to a takings claim. 21 Cl. Ct. at 156-57.
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E. Appeals Courts in New York Have Awarded Just Compensation
for Wetlands Fill Denials-Subject to a Unique Offset
Two cases from New York suggest a novel approach to wetlands
regulations-an approach that properly follows Nollan, appears to
recognize that compensation is due when property is only partially
taken, and which also requires the state government to compensate a
property owner only for the loss of value attributable to state regulations (as opposed to county or federal regulations). In Berwick v.
State (Berwick 1), the court held: "[Wihere a claimant has demonstrated that development of the property is economically feasible, and
... that application of the wetlands regulations has destroyed the economic value of the parcel, or all but a bare residue of that value, he is
entitled to an increment above the restricted value." 38 Therefore, if a
landowner can prove that wetlands regulations harmed the value of
property, the landowner has a chance to recover damages.
However, the court later modified the holding by noting that the
state should not be responsible for diminution in value caused by local
and federal regulations.32 1 Presumably, the property owner must file
suit against those other governmental entities for the remainder of the
value. How the federal and county governments would react to such
lawsuits is a very open question.
In New York, therefore, a takings suit will be complicated by the
existence of overlapping local, state, and federal regulations. If possible, all governmental entities would ideally be joined in one suit after
all administrative remedies are exhausted at all levels of government.
However, once a suit is brought, New York appears willing to grant
compensation.
F. Connecticut Will Find a Taking When a Wetland Owner Has a
Reasonable Expectation of Development
In Gil v. Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Agency,32 ' the Connecticut Supreme Court impliedly rejected the Just v. Marinette
County doctrine, at least in part.
The regulating agency had argued that any claim of a loss of
value to property should be measured only by valuing "the property
. in its natural state; not . . . as the applicant might wish to

318. 486 N.Y.S.2d 260 (App. Div. 1985).
319. Id. at 268.
320. Berwick v. State (Berwick), 552 N.Y.S.2d 409, 411 (App. Div. 1990). Of
course, the mere designation of property as a wetland is not a taking in New York.
Wedinger v. Goldberger, 522 N.E.2d 25 (N.Y. 1988).
321. 593 A.2d 1368 (Conn. 1991). This case was an appeal of an appellate court
decision upholding a $280,000 award for a taking of wetland property. See Gil v. Inland Wetlands and Watercourses Agency, 580 A.2d 538 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990).
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change it." '22 The Connecticut Supreme Court speculated that this
might be a fair argument if an owner purchased property without
"any reasonable investment-backed expectation of development, 3'' 32
but that this was not the case in Gil. Instead, the court ruled that a
"landowner, who purchased property with a reasonable expectation of
residential or commercial development . . . [suffers] a taking if regulatory constraints allow him to use his land only in its natural state
4
without any economically viable alternative use.""
Unfortunately for the wetland owner, the court was not convinced
that the regulation had left the land without economically viable alternative uses. Although four development permits had been denied,
these were all for a home nearly twice the size of the neighboring
homes.325 In Connecticut, therefore, to prevail on a takings claim for a
wetland, a property owner will have to prove first that there was a
reasonable expectation of development of the wetland, and second
''
that the proposed use of the wetland is not "exceedingly grandiose. 321
G. South Carolina Equates the Police Power with a Nuisance Exception to Takings
In Lucas u. South Carolina Coastal Council,327 and Beard v.
South Carolina Coastal Council,3 28 the South Carolina Supreme
Court found no taking under a statute prohibiting construction or reconstruction of homes near the beach. The court reasoned that because the law had an important public safety rationale, there could be
no taking. This was so despite the fact that the trial court in Lucas
had awarded over one million dollars in takings damages. 32 9 The court
reasoned that allowing building close to the shoreline presented an
unacceptable threat to public health and safety. These cases reflect,
from the property owners' perspective, an extreme adoption of the so-

322. Id. at 1373 (citing Manor Dev. Corp. v. Conservation Comm., 433 A.2d 999
(Conn. 1980), citing Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972)).
323. Gil, 593 A.2d at 1373. This formulation implicitly indicates that the "notice"
rule discussed with respect to New Hampshire cases in Part VIII(c), supra, can apply
in certain circumstances.
324. Id. at 1373-74.
325. Id. at 1375.
326. Id. (citation omitted). Also, tracking the balancing language of Florida Rock,
the Connecticut court earlier held that "under the closely related statutes regulating
tidal wetlands . . . the public interests are to be balanced against those of private
landowners in determining whether a taking has occurred." Cioffoletti v. Planning and
Zoning Comm'n, 552 A.2d 796, 805 (Conn. 1989) (citing Brecciaroli v. Commissioners
of Envtl. Protection, 362 A.2d 948 (Conn. 1975)).
327. 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991) (statute which
forbids rebuilding close to shoreline is not a taking).
328. 403 S.E.2d 620 (S.C. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 185 (1991) (no taking
from denial of permit to build bulkhead). See also Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 939 F.2d 165, 170-71 (4th Cir. 1991) (no taking or due process violation from
same statute).
329. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 896.
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called nuisance exception. 3"'
H. Maine Has Recognized Regulatory Takings Only in the Context
of a Legislative Extension of the Public Trust Doctrine
Only once have the courts of Maine recognized that a regulation
can, in the words of Justice Holmes' 1922 holding, go "too far." '' In
Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n v. White, 3" ' no taking was
found when private property was designated as a deer yard despite
the fact that designation as a deer yard made it impossible to further
develop the property. The court presented two rationales for this
holding. First, in an apparent adoption of the notice rule, the court
stated that "the 'taking,' if any, occurred ...before the Whites acquired the property. Second, the record demonstrates on the basis of
the Whites' own testimony that the property has not been substantially reduced in value."3 '
Similarly in Sibley v. Inhabitants of Town of Wells, 334" a zoning
ordinance that reduced the value of a lot from $4,200 to $1,000 was
not a taking because the land retained "substantial value." ' These
cases make it plain that the courts in Maine do not give tremendous
weight to33 the "economically viable use" prong of Agins v. City of
Tiburon. 1
Finally, however, in Bell v. Town of Wells, 33 7 the court ruled in
favor of property owners in a facial takings challenge to a statute that
purported to give the public a right to use privately owned intertidal
lands. The supreme court held that Maine's attempt to extend a socalled "public trust doctrine" to private intertidal property was void
as an unconstitutional taking. This is the only instance where a Maine
regulation has been found to be an inverse condemnation taking. It
should be noted, however, that this case involved a physical invasion,
rather than a regulation that deprived property of value.

330. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (there is always a
taking when all value of property taken, even in light of alleged nuisance); accord
McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1991). See supra note 236 and
accompanying text.
331. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).
332. 521 A.2d 710 (Me. 1987).
333. Id. at 713. The court provided absolutely no legal analysis beyond the quoted
passage, except for a citation to Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation
Comm'n, 450 A.2d 475 (Me. 1982), a case where after permission was granted to cut
trees on only 432 acres in a 25,000 acre township, the court did not find the land
"substantially useless" and therefore there was not a taking.
334. 462 A.2d 27 (Me. 1983).
335. See also Hall v. Board of Envtl. Protection, 528 A.2d 453, 456 (Me. 1987) (no
taking where comparable adjacent properties had sold for "substantial" sums); Opinion of the Justices, 69 A. 627 (Me. 1908) (regulation of timber practices not a taking
when owners still have control and opportunity to realize values).
336. 447 U.S. at 260. See supra text accompanying note 162.
337. 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989).
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In short, Maine property owners bear a difficult burden of demonstrating factually that the value of their property has been taken.
IX.

A

FEW NOVEL TAKINGS DIVERSIONS FROM THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES AND WILD HORSE AND BURRO ACTS

As discussed in Part II(B)(2) of this article, the restrictions
against using property designated as the habitat of an endangered
species may rise to a takings. There is also a unique subset of takings
law arising out of the problem of what happens when critters eat private property, and the property owners are forbidden by law to do
anything about it. Is there a taking?
In Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel," s the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a district court decision that the
government took property when wild horses ate privately owned forage. Under the Wild Horses and Burros Protection, Management and
Control Act,33 it is unlawful to "harass" wild horses when done "maliciously." Assuming, but not holding, that this meant the plaintiff
ranchers could not drive wild horses off private range, the court concluded there could be no taking. Citing a long line of precedent that
damage to private property by protected wildlife is not a taking, " ' the
court found no loss of investment-backed expectations.34 ' There was a
strong dissent by Judge Speth who concluded that the government's
"pervasive" control over the horses, combined with the unique status
of the horses as342"components" of the federal lands, worked together to
create liability.
In the context of the Endangered Species Act, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a sheep rancher was not entitled to compensation when protected grizzly bears ate his sheep. 343 Under normal
circumstances the rancher would have shot the bear and accepted any
incidental losses incurred up to the time the bear was terminated.
But, because he was not allowed to kill the bears, the rancher argued
a taking. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a discussion of the
lack of government liability arising out of actions of wild animals,
found no taking."' In his dissent from the denial of certiorari, Justice

338. 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986).
339. 16 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
340. 799 F.2d at 1428-29.
341. Id. at 1431.
342. Id. at 1431-38.
343. Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, Christy v. Lujan, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989). For two thoughtful discussions on the implications of this
case on takings and the doctrine of the right to protect property, see Lauri Alsup,
Comment, The Right to Protect Property, 21 ENVTL. L. 209 (1991); Geoffrey L. Harrison, Comment, The Endagered Species Act and Ursine Usurpations:A Grizzly Tale
of Two Takings, 58 UNIv. Cm.L. REV. 1101 (1991) (concludes that the Endangered
Species Act "took" property under both physical invasion and regulatory takings
analyses).
344. Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1989).
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White put the issue in terms that even his Eastern brethren could
understand:
There can be little doubt that if a federal statute authorized park
rangers to come around at night and take petitioner's livestock to
feed the bears, such a governmental action would constituted
[sic] a 'taking' . . . [t]hus, if the Government decided (in lieu of
the food stamp program) to enact a law barring grocery store
owners from 'harassing, harming, or pursuing' people who wish to
take food off grocery shelves without paying for it, such a law
might well be suspect under the Fifth Amendment. For similar
reasons, the Endangered Species Act may be suspect as applied in
petitioner's case. 45
X.

CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS

Any practitioner considering bringing an inverse condemnation
claim should also be cognizant of remedies (including the recovery of
attorneys' fees) under the Civil Rights Act.34 The Presbytery court
ruled that there would be no "takings" damages for situations where
there was only a due process violation. However, attorneys should not
forget that if there is any indication that due process (or any other
constitutional rights) have been violated, a civil rights Section 1983
claim should be explored. Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983,
provides for monetary compensation when officials of state and local
government violate a person's civil rights. An unlawful or unconstitutional regulation that
affects private property rights is actionable
347
under this section.
If the unlawful regulatory action is a federal one, rather than a
state one, then a Section 1983 remedy will not be available, although a
Bivens civil rights action might be in order." 8
XI.

CONCLUSION

Whereas the law dealing with the use of the environment is
driven by statute and regulation, the law of takings is driven by case
law. The cases are often contradictory, confused, and confusing. Nevertheless, when applying the law of takings to the regulation of the
345. Christy, 490 U.S. at 1115-16.
346. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1988).
347. San Diego, 450 U.S. at 636 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Lake Country Estates,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979); see also Herrington v.

County of Sonoma, 834 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1987), modified, 857 F.2d 567 (9th Cir.
1988); Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 833 F.2d 267 (11th Cir. 1987) (discussed in
Part IV(A)(1), supra). See also Suess Builders v. City of Beaverton, 656 P.2d 306 (Ore.
1982), for a discussion by the Oregon Supreme Court of civil rights claims in a takings
context.
348. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.

388 (1971).
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environment, certain principles should be followed:
First, be sure to exhaust any available administrative remedies.
Facial attacks on a regulation and/or reliance on a futility argument
are not favored.
Second, be prepared to marshal the facts necessary to prove the
value (or lack of value) of the property in question, the investmentbacked expectations, and whatever compelling reasons there may be
in favor of (or against) the development in question.
Third, it is difficult, but not impossible, to prove a taking under
the rule that regulation takes if it does not substantially advance a
legitimate governmental interest. Even if one cannot prove the regulation fails this threshold totally, any showing that the regulation is too
harsh, overkill, or whatever, may influence some courts when they balance the economic impacts of the regulation.
Fourth, in analyzing the purpose of a regulation, it is clear that
the more a regulation does to prevent public harm or abate a nuisance, the less likely it is to be a taking. Further, the more important
it will be to prove loss of economically viable use.
Fifth, in addressing the economic impacts of a regulation, courts
are split on how to deal with parcels that have been partially developed in the past, or are partially developable today. If at all possible,
a property owner with a takings claim would do well to focus a lawsuit
on the property that is actually impacted by the regulation.
As the government decides that more and more land deserves absolute protection against human use, the law of takings is sure to
evolve. Supporters of property rights hope that it will evolve in the
direction of providing compensation for overregulated property owners. This will thereby discourage excessive regulation of property by
the state and federal governments. Supporters of government regulation, especially over land use, on the other hand, hope for a broadening of the "nuisance exception" to takings, wishing that the exception
will one day be considered as broad as the police power itself.
For those of us who believe that there is a connection between
good government, all our individual liberties, and the protection of
private property rights, the only fair and equitable solution to the
wetlands, endangered species, and other environmental issues will be
to enforce the spirit and letter of the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause. When society makes a determination that some wetlands, habitats, or species are so valuable that they must be protected, then society as a whole should bear the burden of the protection by paying for
the necessary property. Without this protection, we may have wetlands and we may have habitat, but we will not have liberty. We can,
and ought, to have wetlands, habitat, and liberty.
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